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ABSTRACT 
This thesis asks the questions: Are our maritime organizations organized and employed 
properly to ensure our nation’s maritime security? Should maritime law enforcement be 
considered a critical capability for the Navy? Maritime security is not only a priority 
mission in the national and naval strategy, but for the international maritime community 
as well. It is established that law enforcement presents the best means to achieve 
maritime security. By accepting the maritime law enforcement role, the Navy may help 
close maritime security gaps not only in the homeland but also on the maritime global 
commons. Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of the Navy’s lack of law 
enforcement powers on maritime security operations and maritime security as a whole. 
The thesis identifies gaps, shortfalls, and deficiencies in both the Navy’s maritime 
security operations, and maritime security as a whole, due to the restrictions on law 
enforcement roles. It also analyzes the concerns associated with increased law 
enforcement and maritime security roles for the Navy by covering the operational, fiscal, 
and warfighting readiness costs associated with greater maritime security roles. Together 
this will help to determine whether the Navy should consider law enforcement as a 
critical capability and resource it as such. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis asks the question: Are our maritime security organizations—including 
the Navy, Coast Guard, and other organizations—properly organized and employed to 
ensure our nation’s maritime security?  Second, should maritime law enforcement be 
considered a critical capability for the U.S. Navy? The argument is that by accepting the 
maritime law enforcement role, the Navy may help close maritime security gaps not only 
in the homeland but also on the maritime global commons. The possible implications for 
the U.S. Navy are the removal of the barriers preventing law enforcement activity, 
integrating the Coast Guard deeper into naval operations (and likewise the Navy in Coast 
Guard operations), putting into action the organizational and structural changes needed to 
better meet stated strategic priorities and using law enforcement training, operations, and 
cooperation to help secure the maritime commons.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
1. The Threat 
Transnational forces and irregular challenges continue to be the primary threat 
today and for the foreseeable future, 1  especially in the maritime domain. These 
challenges are maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime 
(illicit trafficking), piracy, environmental/resource destruction, and illegal seaborne 
immigration.2 In order to confront these challenges, it is important to understand the 
nature of the irregular challenges we face. The inherent criminal nature of irregular 
maritime threats links them closer to maritime law enforcement oriented missions, rather 
than conventional military ones. These challenges, as Dick Bedford eloquently testifies, 
“will continue to evolve and may be hybrid in nature: an interconnected and 
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, 2010 National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2010), 4. 
2 U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, Naval Operations Concept 2010 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), 35. 
2 
 
unpredictable mix of traditional and irregular warfare, terrorism, and/or organized 
crime.”3 Since the global and United States maritime domain is of vital importance to the 
security and economic well-being of the country and the world, the need for robust 
maritime security utilizing law enforcement capabilities is in demand.  
2. National Concern 
The significance of nontraditional challenges, which are the types of challenges 
best confronted through law enforcement, is well established in higher national strategic 
doctrine. Not surprisingly, these challenges top the list of concerns set out on almost 
every important statement of national and military strategy and policy. The 2010 
National Security Strategy clearly advocates that irregular threats, such as weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) (especially in the hands on violent extremists), terrorism, 
consequences of environmental change, and global criminal networks (pirates, drug 
cartels, etc.) represent the greatest to threat American security and safety.4 These threats 
need to be prevented through the use of intelligence and law enforcement. 5  This 
document is a key piece of national strategy because it represents the pinnacle from 
which other sources of government strategy are derived. The 2011 National Military 
Strategy (NMS 11) is the lead strategy-shaping document for the military and lists 
countering violent extremism first among the National Military Objectives. 6  Violent 
extremism is the epitome of irregular challenges that the United States faces. Among the 
three remaining National Military Objectives,7 the reference to irregular challenges is 
pervasive.8 It seems quite clear that irregular challenges are considered a top priority in 
                                                 
3 Dick Bedford, “The Changing Security Environment,” in Scott Jasper (ed.), Securing Freedom in the 
Global Commons (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 38. 
4 Obama, 2010 National Security Strategy, 8. 
5 Ibid., 20. 
6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), National Military Strategy 2011: Redefining 
America’s Military Leadership (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2011), 4. 
7 The four National Military objectives are: Counter Violent Extremism, Deter and Defeat Aggression, 
Strengthen International and Regional Security, and Shape the Future Force. 
8 CJCS, 2011 National Military Strategy, 4–20. 
3 
 
national security. This establishes that confronting irregular challenges, especially 
through law enforcement, is a security goal of the United States.  
3. International Concern 
Maritime Security is just a concern for the United States, but it is the most 
important concern for most maritime nations. As a study from RAND states, “Partner 
nations will wish to work with the U.S. Navy to meet their hierarchy of needs, which lie 
almost exclusively within the constabulary role.”9 A National Research Council paper 
affirms, “Governments of countries other than the United States tend to be concerned 
much more with the need for information on traditional maritime security concerns—
smuggling, poaching, and piracy—rather than information on direct threats of external 
attack.”10 A paper on the roles of African Maritime Security Forces roles mentions that, 
“A much larger part of their mission set is coast guard in nature and relates to law 
enforcement, environmental protection, and maritime safety obligations that occur within 
a nation’s territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles of the coastline) and exclusive 
economic zone.” 11  Lastly, at the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium, 
maritime security was recognized as the most important focus for almost all maritime 
nations.12 For the Navy to operate globally and interact with partner navies in Global 
Maritime Partnership programs, it is important to recognize that maritime security is what 
concerns the international maritime community the most.  
                                                 
9 Robert Button, Small Ships in Theater Security Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National 
Defense Research Institute, 2008), 16 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10235188.  
10 National Research Council, Maritime Security Partnerships (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academies Press, 2008), 1–2. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12029.  
11 Augustus Vogel, Navies Versus Coast Guards Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security 
Forces (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2009), 2–3 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS119655.  
12 International Seapower Symposium, John B. Hattendorf, and John W. Kennedy, Nineteenth 
International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings 6-9 October 2009 (Newport, R.I.: Naval 




4. U.S. Maritime Security Policy 
U.S. maritime security policy is split into two somewhat related categories—
defense and security—with the Department of Defense as the lead agency for maritime 
defense, and the Coast Guard as the lead agency for maritime security, including 
maritime law enforcement. Despite this difference of roles, maritime challenges can be 
deemed as both defense and security missions, creating overlaps that are difficult to 
resolve with current national policy and doctrine. A Congressional Research Service 
report demonstrates that seven key Navy missions are considered both homeland security 
and homeland defense missions, 13  since the same threats can exist in both sets of 
missions. Even the DoD labels this as a “seam of ambiguity,” where the threat is not 
clearly defined between a military and law enforcement missions.14 This leads to the 
question, who should take the lead in responding to situations given that transnational 
actors no longer present a clear external versus internal threat? Interagency cooperation 
and coordination through supported/supporting roles is the current maritime security 
approach, but is it as efficient as it can be? Possibly, if the Navy accepts law enforcement 
as a necessary instrument to confront maritime security threats, it could ease the 
confusing mission overlaps, eliminate the jurisdictional seams, and increase response 
time and threat coverage. 
Driven by Posse Comitatus and its related DoD instructions restricting military 
forces role in law enforcement, and by its traditional norms, the U.S. Navy has 
consistently shied away from law enforcement activities. Instead, the U.S. Navy prefers 
to focus on maintaining conventional forces overseas, as a first line of defense.15 The 
United States is unique in the separation of law enforcement functions and military 
functions in the maritime service. Many European Navies, including the British Royal 
Navy, French Navy, Spanish Navy, and others, are mandated to conduct maritime law 
                                                 
13 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for 
Congress, CRS RL32665 (Washington, DC: The Service, 2010), 3.  
14 United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Department of Defense Homeland Defense 
and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept: Version 2.0 (Peterson AFB, CO: Strategy and Policy Division 
(J52), USNORTHCOM, 2007) 13. 
15 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 25. 
5 
 
enforcement activities. Even the United States’ neighbors, Canada and Mexico, utilize 
their navies for maritime law enforcement.16  So, why does the U.S. Navy not perform 
law enforcement? The Navy defers on law enforcement matters to the Coast Guard, using 
the Posse Comitatus Act as its rationale. From a long-standing tradition of not conducting 
maritime law enforcement, the Navy likely developed organizational norms and a culture 
that make it difficult to think and act in new ways that may better suited for the maritime 
domain of today and the future. Organizational norms, laws, and directives have created 
barriers that prevent the Navy from understanding how it can improve security in the 
maritime domain.  
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Scenarios 
Two scenarios, one hypothetical and the other real highlight the potential failings 
in U.S. Navy maritime security prosecution.  
Imagine this hypothetical situation: A U.S. Navy vessel is conducting routine 
exercises in the Gulf of Mexico. In the course of training, the U.S. Navy ship happens to 
approach a vessel transiting in the Gulf. The vessel begins to behave strangely, by 
suddenly shifting away from the Navy vessel, as if trying to avoid it. The lookouts on the 
Navy ship watch the vessel and notice people dumping cargo into the water, as it tries to 
move away from the Navy ship. For the Navy crew, the realization sets in they have just 
stumbled on a drug-trafficking boat. The drug-boat is most likely dumping its cargo for 
fear their boat will be boarded and inspected by the Navy warship. Unfortunately, this 
Navy ship has not been assigned any law enforcement officials or a Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) that can actually conduct law enforcement functions, 
because the Navy ship is just conducting routine training. It is not routine to deploy with  
 
 
                                                 
16 Laurence M Hickey, “Enhancing the Naval Mandate for Law Enforcement: Hot Pursuit or Hot 
Potato?,” Canadian Military Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2006), 43. 
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LEDETs, or other law enforcement agencies (LEAs), unless specifically assigned to 
conduct counter-drug operations or law compliance operations. So, what can the Navy 
ship do?  
The answer is practically nothing—due to U.S. Navy law enforcement 
restrictions. Instead, the Navy vessel will contact Navy headquarters to initiate a report, 
which will eventually find its way to the U.S. Coast Guard, who are legally entitled to 
intercept, search, and, seize the drug boat and its crew. Otherwise, the Navy ship can try 
to intimidate the drug ship, in order to attempt it to dump its cargo. By the time the U.S.  
Coast Guard can respond (assuming there was a U.S. Coast Guard vessel nearby that 
could respond in a timely manner), all evidence that can be used to convict the drug-
traffickers has been disposed of.  
In fact, it turns out this scenario is not very hypothetical,17 meaning that this type 
of scenario can occur. Even though the drugs never entered United States, which can be 
considered a partial victory, the drug boat and crew are free to attempt smuggling drugs 
again and any potential intelligence is lost. The ideal and desired outcome of prosecution 
and seizure is lost.18 Can the U.S. Navy feel satisfied with the outcome of this situation? 
More importantly, can American citizens feel comfortable with this situation, knowing a 
symbol of American power and security can only helplessly standby and watch this 
incident occur?  The answer is most likely not. Unfortunately, the inability to adequately 
address these situations is a reality of the current situation. 
Second is a real-world piracy example, where the U.S. Navy is legally allowed to 
perform law enforcement, as permitted by international law. Despite legal law 
                                                 
17 In September of 2011, the USS Sampson, while conducting training exercises, happened upon a 
drug smuggling boat. As the USS Sampson approached the boat, it jettisoned approximately 60 bales of 
drugs and sped from the area. In this case, the Navy was able to recover the drugs but could not give pursuit 
and capture the vessel because it did not have law enforcement powers to do so, Instead, the Navy sent a P-
3 Orion aircraft to track the boat, and the Coast Guard deployed a helicopter and a cutter to the scene. This 
disposition of the boat is unknown. Gidget Fuentes, “Destroyer Recovers Illicit Drugs at Sea,” Navy Times, 
September 27, 2011, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/09/navy-destroyer-recovers-illicit-drugs-at-
sea-092711w/.  
18  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Maritime Operational Threat Response Protocols 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 13.  
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enforcement authority and a mandated anti-piracy mission, inexperience and poor 
training has sometimes failed to achieve desired prosecution of piracy cases. In 2009, the 
U.S. Navy had to release captured pirates because they failed to collect enough evidence 
to go to trial in a Kenyan courts, despite the fact the U.S. Navy ships captured them while 
they were attacking a merchant vessel. 19  Shortly after, the USS Ashland and USS 
Nichols were attacked in 2010 by Somali pirates, leading to the subsequent arrest of the 
attackers.20 The outcome of the trials was very different—in large part because of the 
evidence collection on the part of the ship’s company. The USS Nichols, through their 
own careful preparation, and with the help of Naval Criminal Investigation Service 
personnel onboard who had provided training and expertise to the crew, collected 
evidence that swiftly led to the conviction of the pirates who attacked the ship.21 The 
USS Ashland neither conducted the same preparations, nor had law enforcement officials 
onboard who could provide the necessary law enforcement training, crucial to these 
piracy cases. Poor evidence collection and custody techniques 22  have prevented the 
United States from getting piracy convictions from the USS Ashland pirates, who are still 
awaiting trial for other charges.23  
Transnational forces and irregular challenges continue to be the primary threat 
today and for the foreseeable future,24 especially in the maritime domain. The scenarios 
only cover two types of national security threats on the maritime domain, but the 
restrictions and undesirable outcomes can be applied across the range of threats.  
                                                 
19 Jeff Kline, “Maritime Security,” in Securing Freedom in the Global Commons, ed. Scott Jasper 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 78. 
20 U.S. 5th Fleet Public Affairs, “USS Ashland Captures Pirates,” Navy News, April 4, 2010, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52519.  
21 James Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 114. 
22 The USS Ashland did not receive the same training and had over 12 people within the chain-of-
custody of the evidence, leading to virtual dismissal of the evidence in court. The evidence was key in 
establishing that the accused conducted an act of piracy. Lieutenant Junior Grade Chad Hutchins, in 
discussion with author, Monterey, CA, August 25, 2011. Lieutenant Junior Grade Chad Hutchins is the 
USS Nichols Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Officer who was involved directly with the case. 
23 Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy, 114. 
24 Barrack Obama, 2010 National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2010), 4. 
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2. The Problems 
The scenarios highlight a few potential problem areas for maritime security in the 
maritime domain: To what degree is the U.S. Navy constrained in confronting irregular 
challenges due to the prevailing criminal nature of the challenges that are law 
enforcement mission oriented? Does the Navy have the capability to conduct law 
enforcement missions if need be? Is interagency support enough to cover the legal 
authorities gap? Lastly, maritime law enforcement agencies are spread thin in the 
maritime domain.  For example, the Coast Guard’s current focus on maritime security has 
reduced its capability to perform some of its other important traditional functions.25 Can 
adding law enforcement capability to Navy units help relieve some of the pressure; 
therefore, improving maritime security? Even if law enforcement roles were to help 
maritime security, what are concerns on the effects of law enforcement on the Navy’s 
operations, fiscal costs, and warfighting readiness? These are important issues that need 
further insight given the threats to the maritime domain.  
Are the current policies regarding how the United States prosecutes maritime 
security sufficient? This is both an operational problem and a cost problem. 
Operationally, we must determine whether there are vulnerabilities in current maritime 
security enforcement. For example, given the criminal nature of the majority of irregular 
challenges, are there missed security opportunities because the U.S. Navy could not act 
due to legal and jurisdictional reasons? Could enabling U.S. Navy vessels with the same 
maritime law enforcement capability as U.S. Coast Guard units increase economies of 
force in maritime law enforcement, and therefore, enhance maritime governance 
internationally? Despite best practices and even some demonstrated victories, there are 
seams and gaps in the operational aspects of maritime security that can be exploited.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Stephen L. Caldwell, Coat Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related 
Performance and Management Challenges, (2009); Joe Stephens and Mary Pat Flaherty, “Coast Guard 




Therefore, enabling maritime law enforcement capacity should help reduce potentially 
exploitable areas, increase maritime law enforcement presence, reduce jurisdictional/legal 
limitations, and better streamline resources. 
In terms of cost, there are perceived fiscal, operational, and warfighting readiness 
costs linked to making law enforcement a U.S. Navy capability. Examples include 
training and using expensive military resources to conduct law enforcement, reduction in 
readiness of conventional mission areas, and the potential to misjudge what the greatest  
strategic threat to the maritime domain is. This leads to the question: Is the Navy’s 
current role of support to maritime law enforcement the best compromise of cost and 
benefit? 
3. Hypotheses  
The first hypothesis is that the current situation is not the optimal strategy, but 
that benefits can be gained relative to the potential cost. These costs are partly related to 
the organizational and fiscal barriers that have prevented the Navy from conducting 
maritime law enforcement. Most of the perceived cost problems can be resolved by 
removing these barriers. The problems can be further addressed by the potential 
implications that stem from removing those barriers.  
The second hypothesis is that the Navy’s restrictions in law enforcement do create 
gaps, shortfalls, and deficiencies in maritime security operations at home and abroad. In 
order to determine if there are any seams created by restrictions on the Navy law 
enforcement, it requires a look at how the Navy conducts maritime security operations. 
This will include what capacity, capabilities, and authorities the Navy has to conduct 
maritime security. 
The third hypothesis is that costs to developing law enforcement roles are  worth 
the benefit gained in the improvement of maritime security. This will require identifying 
the costs and concerns relating to maritime security and analyzing the evidence to 




The implications for enabling Navy law enforcement capability will rely on a 
discussion of the possible changes and trends that could take place within Navy. Some 
examples include: Navy realization that the fleet structure is not conducive to combating 
maritime threats, greater cooperation and integration with the Coast Guard in operations 
and jurisdictional areas, reduction in the gaps and seams, and better opportunities for 
commonality with other law enforcement agencies domestically and other navies 
internationally to make maritime security more effective.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Law enforcement is widely understood to be a critical tool in combating criminal 
activities such as illicit trafficking, piracy, and fisheries enforcement. Law enforcement is 
also crucial in dealing with terrorism. As Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw 
point out, one of the most common counter-terrorism tactics is the enactment of anti-
terror legislation to expand the reach of law enforcement agencies. 26  This helps 
underscore the importance of law enforcement to confront terrorism. Richard English 
states, “the usual mechanisms of law can indeed contribute very significantly to, at least, 
the containment or restriction of terrorism.”27 One of those important mechanisms is law 
enforcement. Daniel Byman explains that the United States views terrorism as a criminal 
activity and treats it as such.28 The consensus is that terrorism is considered a criminal 
activity and needs to be prosecuted under criminal law. Another reason that criminal 
threats pose an increased threat is because many terrorist organizations are willing 
customers of criminal transnational criminal organizations. Others argue that while direct 
terrorist threats to maritime security are not high, there are proven connections between 
                                                 
26 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” in 
Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and 
Intergovernmental Cooperation (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 3. 
27 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 135.  
28 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, N.J.: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008), 146. 
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criminal activity and the support of terrorism.29 Martin Murphy makes the connection 
that terrorist activities need hard cash to operate and need to use the skills and services of 
criminal organizations to obtain their objectives. 30  Therefore, the challenges on the 
maritime domain are indeed criminal in nature or linked to criminals, and are most 
appropriately addressed by law enforcement. 
An important piece to review is to understand what others have said about the 
gaps and seams in maritime security. There are two main arguments that come out of the 
literature: First, there is a major maritime security gap that comes from the limitations of 
law enforcement to address problems in the maritime domain. Most of the literature cites 
that maritime law enforcement organizations (in this case the Coast Guard) are 
overwhelmed by their responsibilities given their generally small size and limited 
resources.31 There is a general consensus that the Navy and Coast Guard need to work 
together more closely to help overcome some of the gaps.32 The degree of collaboration 
varies among scholars. Some argue the current division of labor works, but that more 





                                                 
29 Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, “Panel IV: The Threat to the Maritime Domain,” in Economics and Maritime 
Strategy Implications for the 21st Century, ed. Naval War College Intercessional Conference, and 
Richmond M. Lloyd (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2006), 88–89, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo2326.  
30 Martin Murphy, “Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Suitable Role for a Navy?,” 
Naval War College Review 60, no. 3 (Summer, 2007), 30. 
31 Geoffrey Mones and Andrew Webb, “The Coast Guard Needs Help from the . . . Navy and Marine 
Corps,”  Vol. 130: Proceedings 130,  no. 1 (January 2004), 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/205977567?accountid=12702; Charles S. Hamilton, and Patrick M. 
Stillman, “Charting New Seas Navy-Coast Guard Cooperation,” Joint Force Quarterly 35, no.2 (Summer 
2003), 50-57; James Jay Carafano, “Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea,” 
Backgrounder, no. 2041(June, 2007); Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), 342-350; Lawrence J. Korb, Sean E. Duggan, and Laura Conley, Building a 
U.S. Coast Guard for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2010), 13. 
32 Till, Seapower, 351-378. 
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endure the safety.33 Others argue that the Navy needs to either take a more active role in 
maritime security,34 while some argue that there needs to be deep organizational changes 
to help cover the gap.35  
The second gap referred to is a legal authorities gap for the Navy in maritime 
security missions. Very few scholars look at how the legal regime specifically affects 
Navy operations. 36  Most of the authors describe the legal regime (mostly under 
international law) for various maritime security threats or specific types of naval 
operations and determine what operations the Navy can or cannot legally do.37 While it is 
important to identify the authorities the Navy operates under, it does not provide a 
holistic analysis of how the lack of law enforcement roles for the Navy affects multiple 
aspects of their operations. 
Most of this discussion is based on the debate over the applicability of the Posse 
Comitatus Act (PCA) (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter III). There is a 
plethora of literature dealing with the legalities of military/Navy use in law enforcement. 
A majority of the legal reviews came during the early 1980s, a resurgence in the late 
1990s, and early post-9/11 that have provided thorough documentation of the laws, 
                                                 
33 Collin S. Gray, “The Coast Guard and the Navy: It’s Time for a “National Fleet,” Naval War 
College Review 54,no. 3 (Summer 2001), 131-135.  
34 Mones and Webb, “The Coast Guard Needs Help from the . . . Navy and Marine Corps.”; James 
Carafano, “Congress Must Act to Link Navy and Coast Guard Future,” The Heritage Foundation Web 
Memo 294, (June 13, 2003), www.heritage.org. 
35 James Howe, “The Fifth Side of the Pentagon: Moving the Coast Guard,” Joint Force Quarterly 31, 
(Summer 2002), http://search.proquest.com/docview/203624149?accountid=12702; Mark E. Rosen, USN-
USCG Mission Integration (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), 2007).  
36 See Mark Rosen, USN-USCG Mission Integration. The author looks specifically at the legal 
authorities the Navy needs to be on the same level of authorities as the Coast Guard. This work does not 
provide an analysis of how the legal restriction affect operations; Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy. 
37 Craig H. Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2007); Sandra L. Hodgkinson, et al., Challenges to Maritime Interception 
Operations in the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap; American University International Law Review 22, no 
4 (2007), 583–671 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=auilr; James Kraska, 
“Grasping “The Influence of Law on Sea Power,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 
113–135; Craig H. Allen, “The Influence of Law on Sea Power Doctrines: The New Maritime Strategy and 
the Future of the Global Legal Order,” in International Law and Military Operations, ed.  Michael D. 
Carsten (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008); Anonymous, “Piracy, Policy, and Law,” Proceedings 34, 
no. 12 (December 2008). 
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policies, and legal precedents pertaining to the Navy’s involvement in maritime law 
enforcement. A majority of the debate is based around those who oppose the restrictions 
imposed by PCA, and those in favor it. Those opposed to PCA argue that the changing of 
the security environment from traditional threats to more criminally oriented threats 
compels revisions of the restrictions on the military conducting law enforcement; by not 
doing so the military will not be flexible to confront the new challenges.38 For those in 
favor of PCA, the arguments provide two paths: First is premised on a civil libertarian 
viewpoint that the military needs separated from civilian affairs, and that the  
change in security environment is not enough to warrant a change in the current system.39 
The other is based on the idea that involvement in civil affairs will decrease its 
warfighting effectiveness.40 
The scholarly debate over the Navy increasing its roles in maritime security is 
directly concerned with the competition between maritime security and the Navy’s 
traditional warfighting mission. One side argues that maritime security should not be 
conducted because it is too costly to the Navy’s traditional missions.41 The opposite side 
argues that the prevalence of maritime security threats should become a top priority or 
                                                 
38 Christopher A. Abel, “Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus Act, The United States Navy, and 
Federal Law Enforcement at Sea”; Gary Felicetti and John Luce, “The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation 
from the Lawyers,” Parameters 34, no.3 (Aug 2004), 94–107; Mark Rosen, “USN-USCG Integration.” 
39 Craig Trebilcock, “Resurrecting Posse Comitatus in the Post-9/11 World,” Army 59, no. 5 (May 
2009) 21–24. http://search.proquest.com/docview/237078565?accountid=12702.   
40 John Hillen, “Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?,”Parameters 29, no. 3 (Autumn, 1999) 9-23, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/198011483?accountid=12702; Bryan D. Watson, "A Look Down the 
Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion of Military Culture." Air & Space 
Power Journal 22, no. 1 (2008): 93,104,127, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/217770159?accountid=12702. 
41 Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses,” in 
Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press, 2002), 66–67; A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces: Hearing before the House Armed 
Services Committee, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan, Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations, Plans and Strategy), 14; Matthew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A 
Principle in Need of Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly 75, no.2 (Summer 1997), 
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/inprint/75-2/752-10.html; Gray, “The Coast Guard and the Navy,” 114. John 




that costs of maritime security are not detrimental to the Navy’s warfighting mission.42  
This debate is discussed in detail in Chapter V.  
There is a considerable amount of literature that surrounds this thesis topic, but 
none directly answers the question about the operational effects of law enforcement 
restrictions on the Navy’s maritime security operations. However, it does answer the 
question: Are there gaps and seams in maritime security because the Navy does not have 
law enforcement powers? 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis conducts a qualitative analysis of current roles and policies of the 
Navy and other maritime law enforcement agencies (primarily the Coast Guard) 
concerning how maritime security is conducted, especially in maritime law enforcement 
missions. When trying to determine if there are any seams or gaps present in the current 
maritime security operations, it investigates key areas in current operations including the 
authorities, capabilities, and capacity in direct and indirect approach operations, such as 
maritime interdiction and patrol missions and maritime security partnership programs.  
The legal, organizational/cultural, and cost barriers that prevent the Navy from 
conducting law enforcement will also be examined. The legal analysis will include a 
review of current laws and policies and a discussion of arguments for and against the 
legal barrier. The organizational section will entail a historical analysis to see if changes 
in the institution have occurred, as stated in the strategic doctrine. It will need to identify 
the reasons why those changes have or have not occurred. The cost topic will require 
analysis of costs and benefits of conducting maritime security, including fiscal, 
operational readiness, and strategic focus/mission creep.  
The thesis research is a rigorous qualitative analysis using statistical data, case 
studies, maritime security war games and studies conducted by the Naval War College, 
                                                 
42 William Rosenau, “Non-traditional Missions and the Future of the U.S. Military,” Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs 18, no. 1, (Winter/Spring 1994); Thachuk and Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and 
Maritime Responses,” 66–67. 
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Johns Hopkins University, the Navy Warfare Development Command,43 and interviews 
with Coast Guard Headquarters, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) N3 (Operations) and Naval Criminal Investigative Service.  
Statistically determining the degree of proficiency in the Navy’s operational 
maritime security performance is difficult, because the data is almost nonexistent. For 
example, if prosecution of offenders of domestic and international maritime law is the 
most desirable end state, as per Maritime Security Strategy, then a successful mission is 
not only the disruption of an event but also the successful prosecution of the offenders. 
The Navy does not analyze or retain mission data from what it considers non-Navy 
missions, such as law enforcement. For instance, the Navy has no reason to determine its 
proficiency in counterdrug operations, since they only operate in a supporting role to the 
Coast Guard LEDETs or other nations’ law enforcement officials in order to get 
prosecution. The few detailed cases that were available are classified. Even where the 
Navy does have authorities and jurisdiction, as in anti-piracy operations, either no 
performance measures exist,44 and/or, factors determining a mission’s outcome is beyond 
the Navy’s control (i.e., if the choice is made not to prosecute, it is difficult to determine 
if Navy actions were directly responsible).45 Subsequently, the majority of the analysis 
rests on the conclusions derived from open source case studies, studies on the Navy’s role 
in confronting irregular challenges conducted at the Naval War College, Naval Warfare 
Development Center, and John Hopkins University. 
                                                 
43 Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), Confronting Irregular Challenges in the 
Maritime Environment: Scenario Based Exercise and Innovation Continuum Findings and 
Recommendations (May 2010); David DellaVolpe, et al., Irregular Challenges 2010 Game: Game Report 
(September 2010); John Benedict, et al., Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC) Study Results (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2011). 
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and 
Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of 
Africa, by John Pendleton and Stephen Caldewell, (GAO-10-856), Washington, DC: GPO, 2009, 17. 
45 Some pirates are released due to lack of evidence to warrant prosecution (i.e., pirates discard their 
equipment into the ocean), or no nation was willing to prosecute them for political/financial reasons. Lesley 
A. Warner, “Pieces of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa,” Naval 
War College Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 70.  
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F. THESIS ROADMAP 
The first chapter introduced the major questions: Are our maritime organizations 
properly organized and employed properly to ensure our nation’s maritime security? 
Should maritime law enforcement be considered a critical capability for the Navy? This 
chapter established that maritime security is not only a priority mission in the national 
and naval strategy, but for the international maritime community as well. It also 
established that law enforcement presents the best means to achieve maritime security. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of the Navy’s lack of law enforcement 
powers on maritime security operations and maritime security as a whole. The second 
chapter of the thesis will define what maritime security is and what it means to naval 
forces. It will identify the current division of labor for the naval forces in both homeland 
and international maritime security operations. The third chapter will conduct a law 
review in order to understand the authorities and restrictions that Navy operates under 
when conducting maritime security operations. This will help the reader conceptualize 
the legal environment and how law enforcement roles can possibly overcome gaps in the 
legal regime. The fourth chapter identifies gaps, shortfalls, and deficiencies in both the 
Navy’s maritime security operations, and maritime security as a whole, due to the 
restrictions on law enforcement roles. The fifth chapter will then analyze the concerns 
associated with increased law enforcement and maritime security roles for the Navy. It 
will look at the operational, fiscal, and warfighting readiness costs associated with greater 
maritime security roles. The conclusion will tie the argument together as to whether or 
not the Navy should consider law enforcement as a critical capability and resource it as 
such, and provide recommendations. 
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II. MARITIME SECURITY DIVISION OF LABOR  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this chapter is to understand first, what maritime security is and the 
tasks involved to achieve it; and second, the current division of labor in maritime security 
for the U.S. Naval Services.  This is accomplished by understanding the roles that both 
the Navy and Coast Guard play in maritime security. 
Although this study is intended to focus on the Navy’s roles in maritime security, 
this cannot be accomplished without also understanding how the Coast Guard is an 
integral part of the Navy’s Maritime Security Operations (MSO) and maritime security as 
a whole. First, the U.S. Coast Guard’s primary mission is maritime security, and therefore 
is designed to counter maritime security threats (e.g., the model service to provide 
comparison of skills, equipment, and authorities). Second, that state of homeland 
maritime security is predicated on the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct homeland MSO, 
because the Navy primarily operates overseas. Lastly, since maritime law enforcement is 
not a Navy mission, the Coast Guard is the largest provider of legal authorities, maritime 
law enforcement capabilities, and expertise to the Navy. 
B. MARITIME SECURITY AND ITS TASKS 
This section will attempt to define overall maritime security and then define its 
meaning to U.S. naval services. While there are some unique features between homeland 
maritime security and global maritime security, the section will argue that maritime 
security cannot truly be separated between homeland and overseas, because the world’s 
oceans are interconnected and used as a medium to travel between two places. In other 
words, the international affects the domestic. Lastly, this section will list the naval tasks 
involved with maritime security. 
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1. What is Maritime Security? 
Maritime Security is a large and nebulous concept. There are many definitions 
and objectives, but the basic principles are found in the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (NSMS): preserving the freedom of the seas, facilitate and defend commerce, 
maintaining good order (governance) at sea.46  It involves actions from international, 
(International Maritime Organization (IMO)), public (law enforcement, and naval forces), 
and private (shipping companies, ports, privately contracted armed security personnel) 
and entities from all nations to achieve maritime security. For example, this includes 
safety regulations from the IMO, such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (ISPS Code), shipping protection practices,47 and naval patrols. This study focuses 
on the how naval forces, in particular U.S. naval forces, understand and provide maritime 
security. The Navy’s definition of maritime security comes from the 2010 Naval 
Operations Concept, which is the accompaniment to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower (the combined Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps’s maritime 
strategy). The 2010 Naval Operations Concept states: 
Maritime security is… defined as those tasks and operations conducted to 
protect sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open 
seaborne commerce, and to counter maritime related terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and 
illegal seaborne immigration. Effective maritime security requires a 
comprehensive effort to promote global economic stability and protect 
legitimate ocean-borne activities from hostile or illegal acts in the 
maritime domain. In addition to security operations along the U.S. 
coastline, globally-distributed naval forces conducting maritime security 
operations contribute to homeland defense in depth.48 
                                                 
46 Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC), National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (NSMS) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005), 7–8. 
47 A good example of a protection practice is the Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Water 
Off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy 
(BMP4), which is an IMO produced booklet of suggested planning and operational practices for ship 
operators, and Masters transiting in high risk areas. MSC.1/Circ.1339, 14 September 2011, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Documents/1339.pdf.  
48 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 35. 
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For the naval forces maritime security, the focus is on a more direct enforcement role in 
confronting maritime threats and providing security. 
2. Homeland vs. International 
In the maritime domain, the normal construct of the homeland versus the 
international realm does not apply, and the domain should be viewed as one entity. The 
reason is that maritime threats can emanate from anywhere in the world, travel rapidly 
across the maritime domain, and transcend borders to threaten national and homeland 
security interests.49 The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 41/ Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) -13: Maritime Security Policy recognizes “the 
security of the Maritime Domain is a global issue.”50 The National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (referred to as Maritime Security Strategy) erases the distinction between a 
separate international and homeland maritime domain in stating; “The safety and 
economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of 
the world’s oceans,” whose “waters are a single, great ocean, an immense maritime 
domain.” 51  The definition of maritime domain from the Maritime Security Strategy 
further integrates the maritime domain by identifying the domain as “all areas and things 
of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable 
waterway.”52  
3. Maritime Security Tasks   
There are three key tasks for achieving maritime security laid out in the 2010 
Naval Operations Concept: Response operations, national and regional maritime 
cooperation, and awareness.53 This section will identify the main activities in each task. 
                                                 
49 USNORTHCOM, Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating 
Concept, 20. 
50 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 41/ Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) -13: Maritime Security Policy (2005), 2. 
51 MSPCC, National Strategy for Maritime Security 1. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 36. 
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a. Response Operations 
Response operations (or direct approach operations) actively employ naval 
vessels to confront maritime threats and are the most commonly thought of as naval 
maritime security operations. Two types of actions make up response operations: patrols 
with forward presence and ship interdiction operations.  
Patrols and forward presence means placing a ship or platform in an area 
to provide physical presence to offer deterrence, protection, and situational awareness. 
Naval assets can be tasked to specifically for MSO, or they can be conducted in concert 
with other operations. 
Interdiction operations are the most direct maritime security operation 
because they physically involve intercepting a vessel by ship or aircraft, and if need be to 
board a suspect vessel. There are two main types of interception operations: Maritime 
interception operations (MIO) and law enforcement operations (LEO).54 Both types of 
interdictions involve the same techniques of visit, board, search, and seizure, but the 
purpose behind both of them is different.55  
b. National and Regional Maritime Cooperation 
Maritime cooperation is an indirect approach to maritime security. It is an 
indirect approach because it does not directly disrupt a maritime threat, but it is meant to 
improve direct operation or the maritime security process as a whole. Cooperation is 
important because its purpose seams in maritime security between different agencies and 
different nations. Three types of maritime security operations fall under maritime 
cooperation: Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR), National Fleet Policy, and 
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).56 
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Maritime Operational Threat Response  is an interagency process, “which 
establishes protocols that facilitate coordinated, unified, timely, and effective planning 
and execution by the various agencies that have maritime responsibilities…to respond to 
a full range of maritime security threats.”57 The MOTR process calls for an interagency 
council to delegate lead authority and recommend appropriate actions to pursue a desired 
effect.58 This is essential because it ensures that different agencies work with a unified 
purpose in an attempt to close capacity and capability gaps and to eliminate jurisdictional 
overlaps, which can create competition and confusion.  
There are two inherent problems with MOTR. First, any type of 
bureaucratic council or interagency coordination of this magnitude is a slow process that 
does not proactively address emerging threats. Second, these documents still rely on the 
current division of labor and framework of PCA and DODD 5525.5(c) in order to 
mitigate the maritime threat, unless otherwise directed by presidential authority.59  The 
Maritime Operational Threat Response process still does not provide an effective solution 
because the current rules, policies, and laws reinforce the gaps and seams. Despite 
MOTR’s shortcomings, it does begin to address the complexity and variable nature of the 
maritime domain that requires close coordination between maritime security stakeholders 
to be effective in MSO. 
The National Fleet Policy attempts to integrate the Navy and Coast Guard 
unique platforms and capabilities to support operations close to home and abroad.60 This 
is an important step in recognizing the different attributes each organization brings to 
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maritime security. For example, the Coast Guard has broad law enforcement powers and 
civil maritime expertise, while the Navy has many ships and robust equipment. 
Combined, the “National Fleet” becomes a potent weapon of authorities, capabilities, and 
capacity in combating maritime security threats. While the policy is a step in the right 
direction, different mission focus and different resources reduce the integration and 
interoperability of the services. This will be discussed in later chapters. 
Theater Security Cooperation is the chief mechanism to build and ensure 
maritime security abroad, and indirectly at home. Because no nation has the capability of 
achieving global maritime security on its own, only the combined efforts of maritime 
nations can achieve maritime security. As the 2010 Naval Operations Concept states, 
“The responsibility of individual nations to maintain maritime security within their 
waters is the foundation upon which global maritime security is built.”61 The purpose of 
TSC is to, “collaborate with allies and partners alike to develop the expertise, 
infrastructure, awareness, and capacity to respond to the full range of maritime security 
threats and irregular challenges.”62 The global reach of U.S. naval forces puts them in a 
good position to reach allied and partner nations in order to build partner capacity for 
maritime security.  
c. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)  
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness defines MDA 
as: “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that 
could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”63 To 
achieve this, MDA, “requires persistent monitoring of vessels, cargo, people, and 
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infrastructure within and adjacent to the maritime domain.”64 The Navy and Coast Guard 
play a key role as data providers and consumers of MDA.65 
Maritime Domain Awareness is essential in maritime security, because 
MDA attempts to prevent crimes before they happen through transparency, and allows a 
more calculated and efficient employment of limited resources. 66 As many maritime 
security threats conceal their activities within normal civil maritime operations, it 
becomes even more important to use all sources of information to try to pick out the 
threats from normal traffic. To do this requires collaboration, coordination and 
information sharing among interagency and international partners. For example, the Navy 
has robust collection and sensor capabilities, while the Coast Guard and other agencies 
are well tuned into the happenings in civil maritime operations.  
Despite MDA’s importance to naval forces and maritime security, there is 
an abundance of literature on the subject; therefore, this study does not offer any further 
insight into the subject than already exists, and it will not be a main topic of discussion 
for this thesis. 
C. NAVAL SERVICES’ ROLES IN MARITIME SECURITY  
The purpose of this section is to provide background on the Coast Guard and 
Navy’s roles in maritime security. The look at each service will start with the force 
structure to determine what types of platforms and capabilities each service uses in MSO 
and to help conceptualize how the design of the force influences maritime security 
missions. Then, the section will look at the homeland and overseas maritime security 
roles for each service by identifying the key tasks they perform in support of maritime 
security. 
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1. U.S. Navy  
The Navy is a warfighting entity. As such, it has dedicated its forces and missions 
in pursuit of winning wars, but the emergence of maritime security threats in the last two 
decades led the Navy, in 2007, to place maritime security as one of the Navy’s six core 
missions.67 Evidence of the maritime security mission’s importance is quite evident in 
doctrine and daily operations. 68  A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
imparts that naval force global distribution “must extend beyond traditional deployment 
areas and reflect missions ranging from humanitarian operations to an increased emphasis 
on…enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain…by countering piracy, terrorism, 
weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”69 Since most maritime 
security threats do not follow the traditional sense of a nation-state conventional military 
force enemies, it has coined the term “irregular challenges” to encompass all threats that 
are not conventional military enemies. 70 These documents also give equal weight to 
conventional and irregular challenges,71 showing that conventional Navy mission areas 
are still relevant and highly important to naval strategic thinking. As such, the Navy now 
operates to conduct both traditional warfare and confront irregular challenges. 
a. Force Structure 
The U.S. Navy’s force structure is balanced in favor of traditional warfare 
and confronting high-end military threats, due to its statutory warfighting mission.72 This 
means that the majority of Navy general purpose force vessels are open ocean ships with 
high-end sensors, communications equipment, and weapons. Despite being heavily 
dedicated to traditional warfare, almost all of the Navy’s general purpose force ships 
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provide some ability for maritime security.73 This means a majority of the Navy’s vessels 
are capable of addressing both traditional and maritime security threats. Since most Navy 
ships are multi-mission, it also means that vessels will not always be available to support 
maritime security operations as other tasking competes for their presence. 
The Navy’s Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is an 
important element in the Navy’s maritime security role because “NECC provides rapid 
deployable and agile expeditionary forces… to warfare commanders in support of 
maritime security operations around the globe.”74 This is a relatively small specialized 
force that has maritime security and TSC as two of its prime mission sets. Its skills and 
missions allow the Navy to provide some maritime security in primarily green (littoral) 
and brown water (river) environments,75 as opposed to the Navy’s general purpose forces 
that operate from the open ocean.  
b. Homeland Maritime Security Roles 
The Navy’s primary focus in the homeland is defense and serves as the 
primary agency for maritime homeland defense. Some maritime homeland defense 
missions involve planning and directing of “naval operations (e.g., undersea operations, 
mine operations, strike operations, fires, interdiction, amphibious and expeditionary 
operations, and MIO), as well as providing communications systems support and FP 
[force protection],” in protection of the homeland.76 These are some of the more explicit 
military oriented homeland defense missions. 
The Navy is the primary supporting agency to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)/Coast Guard for homeland maritime security. Participation in 
MDA, counter-terrorism, supporting counter-drug operations, Navy critical infrastructure 
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protection, cyberspace, and support to civil authorities all constitute the Navy’s homeland 
maritime security missions. For instance, the Navy participates in MDA through the 
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The Navy also provides forces to U.S. 
Northern Command in support of Operation Noble Eagle (the title for homeland security 
operations). 77  One of the Navy’s best known maritime security missions was the use of 
its patrol craft to help provide port security for U.S. ports after 9/11. The patrol craft 
operated under the control of Coast Guard Atlantic Area with the help of an embarked 
Coast Guard law enforcement detachment (LEDET).78 
The Navy’s restriction from participating in direct law enforcement is the 
principal reason it plays a limited role in homeland maritime security. The preference of 
the Navy is to provide defense and security to the homeland through a layered defense in 
the forward regions and approaches to the homeland,79 so a majority of Navy maritime 
security operations in the maritime domain occur overseas. A potential reason for the 
Navy to prefer overseas operations is to avoid the stigma and conflict in conducting 
domestic operations. The Navy, however, still faces many of the same legal restrictions 
and force structure challenges overseas as it does in the homeland that reduces its 
effectiveness to conduct maritime security.  
c. Overseas Maritime Security Roles 
The Navy participates in maritime security operations on a daily basis 
overseas. One Navy’s main direct approach operations include its participation in 
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) across approximately 2.5 million square miles of 
international waters in the Middle East. CMF is a multi-national naval partnership, whose 
“main focus areas are defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional 
                                                 
77 U.S. Northern Command, “ About USNORTHCOM,” (n.d), 
http://www.northcom.mil/about/index.html#FFC. 
78 Scott Vanier, “Firebolt Returns from Operation Noble Eagle,” Navy News, April 17, 2002, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=1330.  




cooperation, and promoting a safe maritime environment.” 80  It is headquartered and 
commanded by Commander Naval Forces Central Command and U.S. Fifth Fleet, 
making it a U.S. Navy led maritime security operation. CMF is comprised of three 
principal task forces: CTF-150 (maritime security and counter-terrorism), CTF-151 
(counter piracy) and CTF-152 (Arabian Gulf security and cooperation).  
The Navy’s TSC programs range from Maritime Security Force 
Assistance (MSFA) operations, such as patrols for Iraqi offshore oil platform protection, 
to building partner capacity missions. Some of these include the Iraqi Training and 
Advisory Mission, Southern and African Partnership Stations, and the African Maritime 
Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), in which “Navy warships, Coast Guard cutters, 
and partner vessels with embarked Coast Guard LEDETs and mobile training teams 
(MTTs) conduct operations and professional exchanges to advance maritime security and 
law enforcement competencies.” 81  The Navy also conducts multiple exercises that 
incorporate maritime security, ultimately improving the ability of U.S. naval forces to 
respond effectively to regional security threats in concert with its allies and partners. 
Some of the exercises include: “Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the largest combined 
exercise in the Pacific; Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT); Southeast 
Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT); Annual Exercise (ANNUALEX) with 
Japan; FOAL EAGLE in Korea; Baltic Operations Exercise (BALTOPS); and UNITAS, 
PANAMAX, and TRADEWINDS in the Western Hemisphere.”82 
Closer to home, the Navy continues to provide vessels and aircraft for 
counter-illicit trafficking patrols since the 1980s. Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) 
South and West, whose primary goal is the “interdiction of illicit trafficking and other 
narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.”83 To highlight 
this, in the spring of 2010, two Navy vessels conducted counter-illicit trafficking patrols 
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in the Caribbean Sea and off the coasts of Central and South America. They made four 
drug interdictions, seizing over 5 tons of cocaine, and capturing 13 suspected drug 
smugglers and two “go-fast” small boats.84 It is important to note that the Navy still 
required Coast Guard LEDETs to embark in order to accomplish these missions because 
it cannot directly conduct law enforcement missions.  
2. U.S. Coast Guard 
The Coast Guard is unique in that it is a military service and a federal law 
enforcement agency. Due to this, it can operate under a full spectrum of authorities from 
national defense to law enforcement. Despite being a military service, the Coast Guard 
has a “distinctively law-enforcement and regulatory, civilian-lifeguard, and resource-
protecting character,”85 rather than a military character. As the quote indicates, the Coast 
Guard is also a multi-mission agency. It has two primary mission areas, homeland 
security missions and nonhomeland security missions.86 Maritime security only became a 
top priority for the USCG since the 9/11 attacks in 2001.87 Much like the Navy, it has to 
find a balance to conduct both sets of missions. 
a. Force Structure 
The Coast Guard operates over 2,100 boats and cutters88 to govern and 
defend the 3.4 million square miles of U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial 
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waters, 95,000 miles of coastline, and about 360 ports. 89  The Coast Guard’s force 
structure is opposite of the Navy’s. It is primarily a coastal force that is designed for 
patrols/maritime interdiction and rescue operations. Since the Coast Guard vessels are not 
combat ships, they do not need high-end capability to defeat low-end threats, therefore, 
most of its vessels have only basic defenses. The vast majority of these vessels are 
smaller, shallow drafted, and operate along the coast. Less than one hundred cutters can 
operate in the open ocean for any significant amount of time. 
To note, the Coast Guard is struggling to update and reman its long 
neglected service. The Deepwater program provides an important example of the Coast 
Guard’s efforts to update its aging and obsolete force by replacing or adding 91 new 
cutters, 124 new small boats, and 247 new or modernized airplanes, helicopters, and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).90 Although the Deepwater program was initiated in 
the late 1990s, it was not given the credence it deserved until after 9/11.The Deepwater 
program has been plagued by severe budget overruns, acquisition management problems, 
and slow deliveries, delaying the update of the Coast Guard’s fleet. 91 Clearly, these 
setbacks do not improve the ability of the Coast Guard to meet its maritime obligations. 
The Coast Guard has one asset of significant importance to maritime 
security, the LEDET. They represent the best asset for direct LE support for Navy and 
other partner nations’s operations, because they “consist of active duty personnel who 
operate onboard U.S. and partner nation naval vessels in order to provide expanded law 
enforcement authority, expertise and capability to carry out interdiction and apprehension 
operations from U.S. and partner nation surface assets.”92 They can also operate in both 
the homeland and abroad. The Coast Guard Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 called for the 
expansion of LEDETs to 18 total teams with 12 personnel, an increase from 17 teams 
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with 11 personnel each, due to the high demand for operations.93 Even with the existence 
of LEDETs, their small numbers make it difficult to for them to meet their demand.94 
b. Homeland Maritime Security Roles 
As the Navy’s focus is abroad, the Coast Guard’s focus is at home. The 
Coast Guard’s unique role as both a military service and law enforcement agency 
logically places it as the primary agency for providing maritime homeland security.95 It 
can perform a full spectrum of homeland security and maritime homeland defense 
missions with little jurisdictional complications, making it the ideal service to combat a 
majority of threats. The Coast Guard’s unique position puts it into place where it can help 
bridge the gap between military and civilian law enforcement needs because it 
continuously uses the interagency process in its daily operations. Despite its unique and 
adept position, it is limited by its small size and restrictive resources compared to the 
U.S. Navy. 
Seven of its eleven statutory missions are related to maritime security 
including: Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security, Drug Interdiction, Migrant 
Interdiction, Other Law Enforcement, Living Marine Resources, Marine Safety, Marine 
Environmental Protection, and Defense Readiness.96 To highlight some of its maritime 
security efforts and capabilities, in Fiscal Year 2010, the Coast Guard conducted:   
• 16,926 security boardings of small vessels in and around U.S. ports, 
waterways, and coastal regions 
• 19,407 waterborne patrols of fixed security zones 
• 4,015 escorts and boarding of high-capacity passenger vessels and vessels 
carrying certain dangerous cargoes 
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• 1,399 escorts of high-value Navy vessels transiting U.S. waterways 
• removed a total of 202,439 pounds of cocaine, and 36,739 pounds of 
marijuana; seized 56 vessels, and detained 229 suspected smugglers  
• deployed LEDETs aboard U.S. Naval and partner nation warships 
removed over 61,000 pounds of cocaine, 2,000 lbs of marijuana, detained 
74 suspected smugglers, and seized 13 vessels 
• interdicted 2,088 undocumented migrants attempting to illegally enter the 
United States 
• continued the deployment of six patrol boats and their supporting and 
command elements to U.S. Central Command 97 
In addition to its security and law enforcement missions, the U.S. Coast 
Guard has other import statutory missions, like search and rescue and Marine 
Transportation System (MTS) management further extending its resources.98 The Coast 
Guard’s daily operations offer testament to the sizeable efforts of the smallest military 
service. Undoubtedly, their small resources require focusing on the homeland, creating 
the need for their maritime security capabilities and authorities elsewhere in the maritime 
domain.  
c. Overseas Maritime Security Roles 
Because of the Coast Guard’s experience and authorities, they provide 
considerable resources to the U.S. Navy in order to help close the gap caused by the 
Navy’s lack of law enforcement capability. Besides deploying on ships, LEDETs also 
provide security training for partner nations as part of their mission set. 99  In  
addition to LEDET support, the Coast Guard also deploys ships and other support 
elements, like Port Security Units, to combatant commanders and the U.S. Navy to help 
bolster maritime security needs.100 
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The U.S. Coast Guard also uses some of their valuable resources for 
maritime capacity-building assistance to other nations. For example, in 2010, the Coast 
Guard conducted the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership program, 
conducting extensive joint maritime training operations with West African naval 
forces.101 They conducted numerous training events around the globe, in all helping 51 
nations, training a total of 2,503 host country participants. 102  This is an important 
program because capacity building is an integral part of the U.S. maritime strategy. Since 
the Coast Guard resembles most other naval forces around the globe, their expertise and 
translatability to other partner nations is significant. 
D. OTHER AGENCIES  
This section will briefly mention two other agencies (Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service and Customs and Border Patrol) to highlight that although the Navy 
and the Coast Guard are United States’ two largest actors in maritime security, other 
agencies do play important roles in maritime security, coordinated effort is needed among 
many different organizations to leverage the unique skills that each agency has. 
1.  Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service also offers expandable law enforcement 
authorities, capabilities, and expertise for the Navy. It is a small organization with 1,200 
Special Agents to support the Navy at home and around the world.103 Besides providing 
intelligence and interagency support for the Navy, NCIS agents also support direct 
approach MSO. The effectiveness of NCIS agents for support in counter-piracy missions 
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is well documented. 104 NCIS agents do not provide the manpower, tactical boarding 
capability, and operational maritime expertise the LEDETs offer, but they are extremely 
adept at investigation processing, intelligence exploitation, and prosecution package 
building once a boarded vessel is considered secure.105 Use of NCIS agents generate 
operational trade-offs, but they carry the necessary legal authorities to cover the Navy’s 
authority gap in MSO.  
2. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
It is important to note two other important players in homeland maritime security 
operations. They are Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the smaller Immigration 
Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP’s Office of Air and Marine provides 291 aircraft and 
260 marine vessel capabilities to homeland maritime security operations. 106  Their 
missions are in support of the Maritime Security Strategy and Coast Guard in anti-
terrorism and border security. CBP runs a highly important operations center, called the 
Air & Marine Operations Center (AMOC) out of Riverside, California, that monitors all 
air and maritime traffic in the vicinity of the United States. CBP owned, but multiagency 
run, it provides the input of over 250 radar sources and patrol craft, making it the only 
center in the U.S. that has the largest air and maritime picture to provide real time 
security.107 Interestingly, the DoD does provide Air National Guard personnel to the 
AMOC, but not U.S. Navy personnel. This kind of operations center can provide a 
tremendous boost to the maritime domain awareness picture, but it does lack DoD 
interest in the maritime role. A recent example of the coordination through AMOC, in 
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June 2010, a CBP P-3 aircraft detected and directed USCG vessels that stopped $82 
million worth of drugs trafficked in the Caribbean.108  Both agencies fall under DHS and 
maintain a close working relationship through civilian law enforcement agencies. The 
cooperation and integration with the U.S. Navy is limited, providing potential seams in 
the execution of maritime security missions.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Maritime security is a large task involving many entities from international, 
public and private sectors. The end objectives of maritime security is preserving the 
freedom of the seas, facilitate and defending commerce, and maintaining good order 
(governance) at sea. The U.S. Naval Services, by their nature, are predisposed to provide 
maritime security by focusing on managing maritime security threats directly or 
indirectly. They do this by providing security patrols, intercepting suspect vessels, 
providing data for MDA, and building partner capacity through TSC.  
The Navy and Coast Guard are opposite, but complementary services. The Navy 
has many advanced open oceans ships with many high-end capabilities, but little legal 
authorities and law enforcement and civil maritime expertise. The Coast Guard is a much 
smaller organization consisting of primarily coastal vessels with basic defense 
capabilities, but they have broad legal authorities and a well-developed law enforcement 
and civil maritime expertise. Despite their differences, they both seek the same goal of 
providing security for American maritime interests. Combined, the Navy and Coast 
Guard are capable of challenging the full spectrum of maritime threats to the United 
States. However, both services have other primary missions that split their focus away 
from maritime security, threatening to reduce their individual and combined efforts to 
achieve maritime security.  
The Navy is actively involved and focused in maritime security abroad, while the 
Coast Guard leads maritime security in the homeland. Despite their complementary 
                                                 





attributes, their opposite nature also creates problems in achieving maritime security. The 
lack of legal authorities and civil maritime expertise prevent the Navy from fully 
addressing most criminally natured maritime security threats. The Coast Guard’s small 
size prevents them from meeting all their security obligations, as well as providing 
support to the Navy in order to supply the legal authorities needed. The Navy’s overseas 
focus and limited authorities prevent them from providing some of its resources to the 
Coast Guard to meet its homeland security requirements. These are some of the issues 
that will be discussed in Chapter IV. First, it is important to understand what authority the 
Navy does have to address maritime security threats in both the homeland and overseas. 
The next chapter will provide background on the different authorities and restrictions 
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III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the legal authorities framework the 
Navy operates within. As the legal regime is extremely large, this chapter will highlight 
the most important laws and policies as they relate to the Navy’s maritime security 
operations (MSO). The first part of the chapter will establish the current authorities and 
policies that determine the Navy’s law enforcement (LE) powers. The second section will 
examine how the Navy’s authorities relate to different maritime security threats.  
B. CURRENT AUTHORITIES AND POLICIES FOR LE 
1. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and DoD Policy 
Posse Comitatus, and its subsequent policies, is the key guiding principle the 
Navy uses in law enforcement roles. Its restrictions on law enforcement have 
underpinned military norms and directed military thinking for generations of its leaders. 
This section provides a brief background on PCA. It will describe how PCA restricts the 
Navy’s role in law enforcement. Lastly, it will discuss the exceptions to PCA. 
a. Background 
The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) was passed in 1878 
following a reaction against the use of federal troops to maintain law and order during the 
post-Civil War Reconstruction.109 It banned Army personnel from conducting civil law 
enforcement. The bill remains virtually unchanged with the exception of adding the Air 
Force to the law in 1956.110 PCA states: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the  
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Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.111 
A statutory limit to the Navy’s law enforcement activities, akin to PCA, is 
found under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Sec. 375, which directs the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) to create a regulation (DoD Directive (DODD) 5525.5(c)) 112 bringing all 
branches of the military into alignment with PCA. However, the same part of the statute 
sets out several circumstances in which the military may support law enforcement 
agencies, notably in drug-interdiction.113 
b. Stipulations 
The Posse Comitatus Law (18 USC §1385) does not specifically mention 
the Navy, but common belief and practice holds that it pertains to all regular armed 
forces. 114   The important part to understand is that the Navy is not restricted 
constitutionally or statutorily from direct law enforcement. It is restricted only by policy. 
DODD 5525.5(c) restricts DoD personnel from conducting civilian law enforcement 
activities as a matter of administrative interpretation of Title 10, Sec 375. It is important 
to point out that DoD regulation does not indicate any specific terms punishment for 
breaking policy outside of current national law (PCA). At a minimum, PCA and DoD 
policy creates greater ambiguity to the real limitations to the naval services, either by law 
or policy.  
Although PCA’s jurisdiction only applies to America’s territorial limits 
and U.S. persons, DODD 5525.5(c) further restricts all U.S. forces no matter where they 
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are.115 Under this framework, PCA/DoD policy makes it difficult for the U.S. Navy to 
conduct law enforcement related maritime security at home and abroad. In addition to 
PCA, the domestic law does not empower the Navy to conduct law enforcement. This is 
in contrast to the Coast Guard, which receives many Title 14 law enforcement authorities. 
The most important of which are 14 USC §2 and 14 USC §89, which specifically permits 
Coast Guard and its authorized personnel to enforce federal laws.116 This is important 
because the Navy would need the same statutory authority to enforce federal laws for 
homeland maritime security, and in certain instances abroad. Most international treaties 
are nonbinding, relying on domestic national laws to enforce a treaty’s regulations.117 
Regardless of the legal contradictions, The U.S. Navy cites Posse 
Comitatus and its related DoD instructions, as well as its traditional norms, when it 
demurs from law enforcement activities. The DoD’s (and the Navy’s) firm adherence to 
PCA and the restrictions imposed by DODD 5525.5(c) cannot be understated.  
c. Exceptions 
Paradoxically, even with PCA and strong adherence to DoD policy, the 
U.S. Navy still has some latitude in countering threats on the maritime domain. DODD 
5525.5(c) and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5820.7C 
provide exceptions to U.S. Navy direct assistance to law enforcement. There are three 
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particular of note, crimes involving nuclear materials, fisheries enforcement, and 
exceptions to policy granted on case-by-case basis.118  How the exceptions affect the 
Navy’s ability to confront those two maritime threats is discussed later in the chapter.  
The most important exception to policy is the policy waivers that can be 
granted by the SECDEF or the SECNAV, with SECDEF approval. Within the territorial 
limits of the U.S. and for incidents involving U.S. persons, the waivers are limited to 
requests by the Attorney General for assistance, or a serious threat posed to the U.S. 
interests where law enforcement assets are not available or capable of addressing the 
threat.119 Outside the territorial United States, the waivers are at the discretion of the 
SECDEF or SECNAV. Reasonably, the exception of policy for direct participation of the 
U.S. Navy in law enforcement can be granted to any maritime threat, as long as the threat 
is deemed as a serious threat to U.S. interests. The flexibility for the Navy’s use is, 
therefore, truly only limited to the will of executive authority (the President and 
SECDEF). Despite the existence of the liberating exception of policy clause, the area of 
military use in seemingly civil affairs oriented issues has seldom been challenged, 
consequently making the clause’s potential useless. 
2. International Law 
Since the maritime domain is largely international in nature, the rules and 
regulations that govern how nations interact with each other is important to MSO. 
Because the Navy has little enforcement power, derived from domestic laws and policies, 
international law becomes the largest source of MSO enforcement authority. This section 
covers four important international maritime law regimes from which the Navy derives 
most of its authorities. 
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a. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)  
UNCLOS codified customary international law into a international 
maritime legal regime. It underpins the rights of nations at sea, as well as governing the 
rights and obligations between nations at sea. The Primer for the Maritime Security 
Multilateral Planners Conference (MPC) VI held in Denmark 13–15 May 2008 
summarizes UNCLOS meaning to maritime security well: 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves 
as a cornerstone for peacetime maritime security, providing a stable and 
widely accepted legal order of the oceans. The Convention recognizes 
rules for the status of ships and their nationality, immunities of warships, 
prohibitions on universal crimes such as the transport of slaves and 
maritime piracy, control of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, provides for 
a right of visit in certain circumstances, and establishes a framework for 
the peaceful resolution of disputes arising from maritime matters.120 
The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, so the U.S. is not legally bound by its 
rules. However, it does abide by UNCLOS as a matter of custom and policy.121 This 
means that the United States can act within its own national interest contrary to 
international law, if it chooses (e.g., executive authority). 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea contains several 
provisions relating specifically to maritime security. Those provisions establish piracy 
and trafficking in human slaves as universal crimes, meaning any nation may take action 
against them.122 Article 108 provides for the control of the illicit drug-trafficking.123 The 
last important article, Article 110, permits warships to exercise the right of “approach and 
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visit” of merchant vessels on the high seas by warships of all nations in order to stop a 
universal crime or verify the vessel’s flag state. This article is important because the 
Navy can gain access to any merchant vessel, even without the consent of the flag state. 
This does not allow the Navy to enforce laws, except universal crimes, however, it can 
help in disrupting a threat until the proper legal authorizations can be obtained to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime. 
b. International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
The IMO, “as a specialized agency of the UN recognized in the law of the 
sea as the “competent international organization” for the setting of worldwide shipping 
standards and approval of coastal-state regulations affecting international shipping, is the 
key institution for the development of international maritime law.”124 The IMO “member 
states have adopted nearly fifty treaties and hundreds of codes, guidelines, and 
recommendations that address nearly all aspects of shipping and are now applicable to 
almost 100 percent of global tonnage.”125 The organization is valuable in promoting safe, 
clean, and efficient shipping. 
The primary U.S. representative to the IMO is the U.S. Coast Guard. 126 
Not only does the Coast Guard support U.S. positions on maritime issues, it makes use of 
the IMO to gain a holistic “view of maritime governance, in terms of regimes, awareness 
and operations.”127 Since almost the entire world’s shipping follows the IMO and its 
guidelines, and the fact that maritime security threats typically utilize civil shipping, 
understanding its processes and regulations should be of the utmost importance to the 
Navy. Leveraging the Coast Guard’s influence in the IMO is important to aid the Navy’s 
effort in maritime security. 
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c. United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs)  
United Nations Security Council Resolutions are the strongest of 
international authorities granting the Navy to conduct maritime security/law enforcement 
missions. Since they are legally binding, they essentially become law. There have been 
multiple UNSCRs since 1990 that allow the Navy to act in a near law enforcement 
capacity to address threats to the maritime domain.128 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions can authorize the U.S. to use 
the Navy to “intercept vessels and possibly board, inspect, search, and seize them or their 
cargoes as necessary to restore international peace and security.”129 This led to the Navy’s 
maritime interception operations (MIO), an important Navy mission area for maritime 
security. MIO, although useful for maritime security operations, its “specific political, 
geographic, and tactical factors, and the legal authority on which the MIO is based, influence 
the enforcement procedures,”130 limiting its jurisdictional reach. Because UNSCR authorities 
tended to be limited and specific, it restrained practical application to other maritime 
challenges, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, fisheries, and others. 
d.  The 1988 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and the Protocol of 
2005 to the SUA (2005 SUA Protocol) 
These two conventions are important, because they increased the 
international authorities for the Navy to act against terrorism, piracy, and WMD. An 
article from the American University International Law Review summarizes SUA’s 
objective: 
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The SUA is of paramount significance to modern MIOs…the main 
purpose of SUA is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against 
persons committing unlawful acts against ships. These acts include the 
seizure of ships by force, and acts of violence against persons on board 
ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship, which are likely to 
destroy or damage it, if the act endangers or is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of the ship. Under the terms of SUA, Member States must 
either extradite or prosecute alleged offenders.131 
The 2005 SUA Protocol increased the potency of the original SUA by 
adding extra offenses, such as WMD (biological, chemical, nuclear, and using a ship or 
its cargo as a WMD). But most importantly, it is the first international law that authorizes 
MIOs without the need for a UN Security Council Resolution. The Navy can board a 
vessel with flag state consent, if the Navy has reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
vessel or a person on board the ship is committing, has committed, or is about to commit 
an offense under SUA. However, if the vessel’s flag state does not respond to a boarding 
request within four hours, the Navy may board the vessel.132 The 2005 SUA Protocol 
authorizes law enforcement or other officials from warships or military aircraft to carry 
out such boardings. 
3. Executive Authority 
Executive authority refers to the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s 
capability to award additional enforcement powers to the Navy. In doing so, the Navy can 
carry out ad hoc missions outside of their statutory responsibilities. In other words, 
executive authorities override both DoD policy and international law for the purpose of 
national interests. There are four important maritime security missions that fall under 
executive authority: the Proliferation Security Initiative, bilateral/multilateral agreements, 
expanded MIO, and self-defense. 
                                                 




a. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
The U.S. created (meaning outside of the UN) the Proliferation Security 
Initiative legally authorizing the U.S. Navy to conduct maritime enforcement via 
Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), 133 a key component of counter-proliferation 
strategy.134 Proliferation Security Initiative “is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking 
of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate 
actors of proliferation concern.”135  Essentially, PSI is a refinement and a modern day 
advancement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and UNSCR 1540, allowing 
greater flexibility to countering WMD proliferation. PSI ship boarding agreements 
provide the legal authority to board signatory vessels, if suspected of carrying WMD and 
related materials. 136 The agreements include the majority of the flag of convenience 
registry countries, such as Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands, and the Bahamas that 
account for over fifty percent of worldwide shipping. 137  For other PSI signatory 
countries, only slightly more coordination is required to conduct maritime counter-
proliferation operations. Overall, there are currently over 90 signatory countries.138 PSI is 
potentially useful for the Navy because it creates a potentially large extension of its 
jurisdiction to counter WMD threats.  
b. Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements 
Bilateral and multilateral agreements are important because they utilize a 
variety of strategies between the United States and contracting nations to allow the 
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United States to either enforce the laws of another country or extend U.S. jurisdiction 
over maritime security threats in order to suppress maritime security threats.139  Since the 
majority of the maritime global commons is not under U.S. jurisdiction, these agreements 
are important to expand the legal reach of the United States to address maritime threats. 
PSI is a good example of a type of multilateral agreement between nations that can 
dictate the extent of use of U.S. Navy assets in maritime law enforcement. As 
international maritime laws, in general, cease at the territorial seas of other countries, the 
agreements between countries can be crucial in the extension of maritime security into 
areas under a state’s jurisdiction. In the case of Somalia, Somali pirates used Somali 
territorial waters as a safe haven form international anti-piracy forces until the Somali 
government authorized the international piracy suppression laws jurisdiction to include 
their territorial waters.140 The U.S. Navy can now legally conduct unhindered anti-piracy 
operations in Somali waters. The United States has many similar agreements related to 
counter-drug operations, but their applicability is characteristically limited to U.S. law 
enforcement agencies. Furthermore, most maritime drug-interdiction operations outside 
U.S. territory are performed by U.S. Navy assets under the operational and tactical 
control of the U.S. Coast Guard, almost making it an important Navy mission that could 
use the help of the agreements. In the end, many of the maritime counter-drug operations 
are superficially civil law enforcement oriented. Possibly, the restructuring the 
agreements to allow U.S. Navy direct participation could enhance the operational 
effectiveness of the agreements regime. 
c. Expanded MIO (EMIO) 
Expanded Maritime Interception Operations offers an even greater 
extension to standard MIO because it does not require international law or agreements, 
but presidential authorization through the Secretary of Defense.141 The purpose of EMIO 
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is primarily an anti-terrorism tool seeking to “deter, degrade, and prevent attacks against 
the U.S. and its allies,”142 but it can really be seen as a tool of the national security 
agenda. Essentially, EMIO can be used in any situation affecting national security, as 
seen appropriate by the Executive. Even without UNSCR support, EMIO was used to 
support Global War on Terror by intercepting terrorists, and terrorist related material143 
The Navy uses EMIO authority currently to conduct CMF’s MSO patrols in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation New Dawn in the Middle East, Horn of 
Africa, and Indian Ocean,144 but the authorities are applicable anywhere. This measure is 
extremely useful to counter problems posed by grey areas between maritime security 
threats, as long as the threat deemed sufficient to warrant executive authority. To 
determine how often EMIO is employed and to what effect creates an interesting avenue 
for further research. Expanded Maritime Interception Operations will probably be 
sufficient for a majority of maritime threat instances, but may be limited in immediate 
threat situations due to the time it takes to get the necessary authorizations. This is where 
self-defense governed by the rules of engagement (ROE) can in most instances fill the 
gap. 
d. Self-Defense  
Self-defense can be considered the fastest means to take actions in 
immediate threat situations, which can occur in piracy, maritime terrorism, and WMD 
scenarios. If there is immediate threat to life or property, self-defense authorizes the use 
of law enforcement techniques (search and seizure) to prevent attacks. There are three 
types of self-defense that can apply to the U.S. Navy in an immediate threat situation: 
individual, unit, and collective. As established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B Standing ROE (SROE)/Standing Rules for 
the Use of Force (SRUF), commanders are to protect the “U.S., U.S. forces, and other 
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designated persons or property.”145 The Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention 
furthers the requirement to protect any innocent maritime asset, therefore this can be seen 
as an extension of either unit or collective self-defense. Standing Rules of Engagement 
(SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) instructs that the least means of 
force should be utilized and deadly force is only authorized if the situation dictates and 
all other reasonable means are exhausted.146 This means that law enforcement techniques 
are the most preferable way to address these situations. Commanders may have difficulty 
reconciling restrictive PCA/DoD policy with authorized reasonable least force self-
defense measures in imminent threats scenarios. 
4. Summary 
Since the Navy’s law enforcement powers are only restricted by policy, 
exceptions to policy can and are sometimes used to allow the Navy to conduct maritime 
law enforcement (or related activities). International law, especially UNSCRs, and 
executive authorities also provide the Navy with exceptions to PCA and give the Navy 
considerable latitude in confronting maritime security threats. However, the Navy’s 
adherence to PCA and its related policy creates the restrictions that prevent the Navy 
from conducting law enforcement at home and abroad. 
C. THE NAVY’S LEGAL AUTHORITIES—AS THEY APPLY TO 
MARITIME SECURITY THREATS 
This section of the chapter will look at what authorities and how the Navy can use 
its authorities to disrupt the National Strategy for Maritime Security’s indentified 
maritime security threats. It will also determine what powers the Navy has to allow for 
prosecution of offenders, since prosecution is an important part of law enforcement. 
There are three very important caveats to keep in mind when addressing the authorities to 
confront threats. First, the default answer to the threats is that the Navy does not normally 
conduct law enforcement. Second, in instances where the U.S. does not have jurisdiction, 
                                                 




it requires the consent of the nation that does have jurisdiction over the threat to allow 
law enforcement actions. Third, the President can waive restrictions on authorities, if it is 
necessary for national security, as long as it is constitutional. 
1. Terrorism 
The Navy has several authorities that allow it to combat terrorism. Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention and the 2005 SUA protocols provide the international 
authorities for the Navy to intercept vessels suspected of carrying or engaging in terrorist 
activities. Expanded maritime interception operations and self-defense are two executive 
authorities that authorize the Navy to engage maritime terrorist threats. While the Navy 
can disrupt the threats and detain terrorists, there is no standard legal regime to allow for 
the arrest and prosecution of terrorists unless by agreement with another nation. The 
Navy has no authority to arrest terrorists for prosecution in U.S. courts.147 
2. Weapons Proliferation 
Weapons proliferation refers typically to WMD movements,148 and not small-
arms trafficking, which is normally considered a customs issue. The Navy derives its 
authorities for interdict and disrupts vessels with WMD under the SUA Protocols, 
UNSCR 1540, PSI, and EMIO. If the crime involves nuclear material, the Navy has 
statutory authority to assist directly in law enforcement (18 USC §831).149 However, if 
the offenders are to be prosecuted abroad, it would either require a bilateral or  
multilateral agreement for another country to prosecute (which is what PSI provides). 
Similar to terrorism, The Navy has no authority to arrest offenders directly involved with 
WMD for prosecution in U.S. courts.150  
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The reason the U.S. Navy actively prosecutes piracy today is based on the 
combination of historical tradition, its visibility and importance to economic security, and 
Executive pressure.151 Since piracy is considered a universal crime, the authorities that 
allow the Navy to conduct anti-piracy missions are well established in international law 
and United Nation Security Resolutions.152 Piracy is one of the rare threats for which The 
Navy has domestic law enforcement authority (18 USC §1651) to arrest and allow 
prosecution of pirates in U.S. Courts. The successful prosecution of the pirates arrested 
by crew of the USS Nichols provides the case in point.153 Despite the Navy’s authority to 
prosecute piracy, it is not always competent in its prosecution, as witnessed in nearly 
identical case of the USS Ashland. 
4. Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Trafficking 
The Navy has little to no authority for disrupting and prosecuting drug trafficking 
or other forms of illicit trafficking (e.g., money laundering and firearms). Under the 
international law, the UN Convention on Illicit Traffic of Narcotics and Psychotropic 
Drugs (1988) and The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2000), including its subsequent protocols, provide international authority for 
countering drug trafficking or other forms of illicit trafficking. However, these crimes are 
not considered universal crimes, but routine or regular crimes; therefore, they are seen as 
customary law enforcement missions that the Navy is not allowed to directly participate 
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in due to PCA.154 For counterdrug missions, this is almost contradictory because the 
DoD is the main agency for detection and monitoring of drug trafficking into the United 
States and legislatively mandated to provide support short of actual interdiction and 
arrest.155  
There is one exception to counterdrug restrictions and that is narco-terrorism. As 
long as a connection can be made between terrorism or another enemy and drug 
trafficking, counterdrug missions can be conducted under EMIO. This was the case in 
2003 when the USS Decatur intercepted several vessels in the Arabian Gulf with over 
two tons of narcotics worth eight to ten million dollars. These vessels were known to 
have links with al Qaeda.156 EMIO is conducted for narco-terrorist missions involving 
Afghanistan’s opium smuggling in Operation Enduring Freedom.157 
In order to mend the seams between support and actual LE functions, Congress 
mandates that U.S. Navy vessels carry U.S. Coast Guard LEDETs.158 LEDETs become 
an important maritime security tool for U.S. Navy units because they are deployed 
around to world to legally support the Navy’s maritime security missions. 
Bilateral/multilateral agreements offer the other way to allow the Navy to conduct LE 
against illicit trafficking. The prohibition again domestic law enforcement and lack of 
federal laws prevent the Navy from arresting and prosecuting these threats in U.S. courts. 
5. Slave Trade and Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 
Just as international law recognizes piracy as a universal crime, slave trade is also 
recognized as a universal crime. International law and U.S. statutory law (18 USC 
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Chapter 77) give permission for the Navy to act in a law enforcement capacity, including 
arrest and possible prosecution of offenders.159  
Trafficking in Persons is arguably the modern day equivalent to slave trade. 
Despite contemplation to declare TIP as slave trade, the connection has not officially 
been made.160  As such, the 2000 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime and two of its protocols161 is the primary international instrument covering this. 
Specifically, Article 8 permits a flag state to authorize another state to board and search 
vessels suspected of TIP. 
This is not an easy problem area for ships to randomly address. It requires 
actionable intelligence and interagency/international cooperation, as they are the key 
components to this sort of operation, in order for the U.S. Navy to deal with this threat. 
Low mission priority, coupled with the fact TIP is very similar to illegal seaborne 
migration, is a mission that the U.S. Navy is neither practiced nor comfortable in 
prosecuting, despite the international justification to do so. Again, the Navy has no 
statutory right to enforce U.S. domestic law for arrest and prosecution of offenders in 
U.S. courts. 
6. Illegal Seaborne Migration 
Illegal seaborne immigration is addressed by alien migrant interception operations 
(AMIO), which is defined as “civil or military actions to prevent alien migration from 
illegally entering the United States.” 162   The U.S. Navy can conduct AMIO for 
‘humanitarian reasons’163 to stop illegal immigration but not perform LE functions, such 
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as customs enforcement. Unless a vessel is carrying a LEDET on board, the line remains 
unclear as to when the U.S. Navy can declare AMIO for humanitarian purposes. The 
Navy can encounter migrants through the course of their normal duties, or can be detailed 
to the U.S. Coast Guard in support of mass migrations, as experienced with mass Cuban 
and Haitian seaborne migrations in the early 1990s.164 
7. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing 
Fisheries Enforcement is not a standard Navy mission. However, the High Seas 
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, a law created to implement UN General Assembly 
Resolution 44/225, mandates that DoD commanders “will plan for and use all-source 
intelligence and maritime monitoring and collection assets, as appropriate, to detect and 
track prohibited driftnet fishing and driftnet fishing vessels on the high seas.”165 As a 
matter of policy, the DoD may provide support to law enforcement personnel, but it has 
no authority to engage in an arrest or seizure of a vessel engaged in illegal driftnet fishing 
activity.166  
The Navy can participate directly in fisheries law enforcement due to a statutory 
exception to PCA (Magnuson Act, 16 USC §1861(a)).167 As a matter of interpretation of 
the 16 USC §1861, the Coast Guard, as the lead agency for fisheries law enforcement, 
could fashion an agreement or memorandum of understanding (MOU) to allow the Navy 
to participate directly in fisheries law enforcement. However, there are no domestic laws 
that allow the Navy to enforce fisheries laws independently of federal law enforcement 
agencies, so it can only assist other agencies in search and seizure. 
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The Navy can derive its powers to confront almost every maritime security threat, 
either through international or domestic authorities. Some form of international law or 
treaty gives international justification for the disruption of almost every maritime threat, 
while domestic authorities to do the same are much fewer. However, in most 
circumstances, restrictive domestic law and policies prevail over international 
authorization. This limits the law enforcement powers for the Navy, especially in 
allowing the prosecution of maritime security offenders. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are no constitutional or statutory restrictions on the military, but PCA’s 
legacy and DoD policy still dictate the restrictive rules that govern the U.S. Navy’s authority 
to conduct law enforcement. While international law may provide justification for maritime 
security enforcement, domestic law restricts its applicability. This strict adherence to DoD 
policy creates a dichotomy compared to the flexible authorities and many exceptions the U.S. 
Navy can exploit in order conduct LE for maritime security missions.  
This chapter shows the current legal regime governing the Navy’s authorities to 
enforce maritime security is large, complex, and in many ways contradictory. Despite its 
complexity, the Navy’s unwavering adherence to PCA prevents the Navy from accepting 
maritime law enforcement as a critical tool from maritime, despite its warranted use. The 
changing security environment sees the use of international law and policy exceptions in 
order to address the rising maritime security threat. Due in part to PCA, the Navy has not 
prepared itself for the law enforcement roles. This leads to the question: since the Navy is 
not prepared for law enforcement, how does that affect both the Navy’s effectiveness in 
maritime security and maritime security as a whole? 
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IV. GAPS/DEFICIENCIES IN MARITIME SECURITY 
OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in Chapter I, maritime law enforcement (LE) offers the best means to 
deter and defeat the criminal nature of most maritime threats at sea. Since maritime law 
enforcement is not a compulsory Navy role, this chapter will assess the impact of the 
Navy’s limited law enforcement role on maritime security. For law enforcement to be 
effective, organizations require three key factors: authority, capability, and capacity. 
Authority: (laws, policies, and LE powers) grants permission to an organization to apply 
their capability and capacity to the problem. Capability: (skills, proficiency, equipment, 
and information) determines how and what those assets (capacity) do to cover the 
problem. Capacity: (defined as a number of personnel, platforms, and/or systems), 
determines the amount of effort the organization can use to address the problem. These 
factors are critical to understanding the gaps/deficiencies/shortfalls in the Navy’s ability 
to conduct maritime security operations (MSO), as well as its effect on overall maritime 
security. 
As discussed in Chapter II, Navy MSO is conducted using two approaches: Direct 
operations (patrolling/interdiction/security enforcement) and indirect operations (building 
partner capacity/information sharing/maritime domain awareness). 168  These two 
approaches will serve as the framework from which gaps in capacity, capability, and 
authority can be identified. The first part of this chapter identifies and explains the 
important gaps/deficiencies/shortfalls in capacity, capability, and authorities that affect 
the Navy’s direct approach operations to MSO. The second part of this chapter identifies 
and explains important gaps/deficiencies/shortfalls in capacity, capability, and authorities 
that affect the Navy’s indirect approaches to maritime security. The identified  
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gaps/deficiencies/shortfalls in this chapter are not exhaustive, but they are critical to 
understanding how the limited law enforcement roles of the Navy affects MSO and 
maritime security as a whole. 
B. DIRECT APPROACH OPERATIONS 
Direct approach operations are essential to discuss because they determine the 
Navy’s ability to conduct and confront maritime security operations. The direct approach 
to maritime security involves the Navy in actual enforcement missions, whether 
providing deterrent presence by patrolling waters or actually interdicting and boarding a 
vessel. The Navy’s direct approach to maritime security operations poses problems for 
each key factor of maritime security: authority, capability, and capacity. This section 
addresses the problems for each key factor as it relates to general MSO, as well as 
problems specific to homeland maritime security, and specific to international maritime 
security. First, authorities will be discussed. Authorities are the most important aspect to 
maritime security because it gives the Navy the right to conduct maritime law 
enforcement. Without it, there is no purpose to employ skills and platforms necessary to 
enforce maritime security. Therefore, it is important to establish the operational effects 
caused by the Navy’s restrictive law enforcement authorities. Second, capabilities will be 
covered. Personnel need to be properly trained and equipped to use police powers in 
maritime security. As such, determining the Navy’s deficiencies in LE skills and their 
effects on MSO is important. Lastly, capacity will be discussed. Since the Navy has the 
platforms and people to conduct maritime security, but not the authority or skills, it 
becomes important to identify the capacity shortfalls created by restrictions and lack of 
skill in maritime LE.  
As the Coast Guard is integral to U.S. and Navy maritime security operations and 
is the only major maritime LE service at home and abroad, its gaps/shortfalls in direct 





Legal authorities are important in maritime security operations because authorities 
determine what an organization legally can and cannot do. The last chapter establishes 
the Navy’s current authorities in MSO, but this section covers some of the operational 
effects caused by the Navy’s restrictive law enforcement authorities. Two main problems 
affecting Navy MSO are; restrictive authorities limit desirable operational outcomes, and 
the complex legal/policy system, with ad hoc and inconsistently employed LE authority 
exceptions can create operational confusion for Commanders. 
a. General MSO Authority Gaps 
The first authority gaps are that the Navy’s limited authority only allows it 
to address a small portion of the maritime security threats (Figure 1). While the figure 
shows that the Navy can confront roughly half of the maritime security threats, those 
threats have the lowest frequency and likelihood of occurrence, with the exception of 
narco-terrorism.169 This means a majority of maritime security threats are outside of the 
Navy’s authority to confront. For the Navy to engage narco-terrorists, the threats need to 
be linked (typically by means of intelligence cuing) clearly to a terrorist organization.170 
Consequently, the extra step to ensure the link and probable ambiguity of certain cases 
will limit the Navy’s interdiction of those threats. With the Navy only able to challenge a 
small portion of maritime security threats, it degrades the Navy’s effectiveness in overall 
maritime security. 
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Current Authorities Versus Maritime Security Threats 
Maritime Security Threat Coast Guard Navy 
Drug-Trafficking ✓  
Environmental Destruction ✓  
Human Trafficking ✓  
Illegal Seaborne Migration ✓  
Illegal, Unregulated, and 
Unreported (IUU) Fishing 
✓  
Narco-Terrorism (drug 
trafficking linked to terrorism) 
✓ ✓ 
Piracy ✓ ✓ 
Slave Trade ✓ ✓ 
Terrorism ✓ ✓ 
WMD ✓ ✓ 
Figure 1.   Current vs. Proposed Expanded Maritime Security Authorities171 
 
The lack of authority that prevents the prosecution or punishment of 
threats creates the second authority gap. To manage maritime security threats ideally 
requires two actions: to stop or disrupt the threat and to punish (in most cases arrest and 
prosecute) those responsible. 172  Having the capability and authority to do both is 
important to increasing the effectiveness of operations.  
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But while disruption offers immediate success, the ability to punish proves 
to have a more far-reaching success. How naval assets can disrupt or stop threats is 
important. Most maritime security threats will not likely require the employment of 
destructive kinetic force because of the nonmilitary nature of the threats and/or political 
and civil sensitivities. Drugs, people, and weapons, smuggled by increasingly 
sophisticated methods on vessels, require the necessary authority and expertise to 
perform proper searches to find them. For example, Coast Guard searches of suspected 
vessels, empowered by their legal authority, could take several days, and usually employ 
personnel who are experts at understanding commercial vessels in order to detect 
anomalies.173  
Punishment is important because it offers two means to further efforts 
against maritime security threats. Punishment creates a greater deterrent effect and it can 
be leveraged to obtain information needed to more effectively address future threats. 
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) provides evidence of the positive effects 
in leveraging both parts. JIATF-S, being primarily a DoD organization, used to prioritize 
drug seizures over prosecution, in part because it lacks solid law enforcement knowledge, 
and culturally, did not care to learn.174 Eventually, JIATF-S learned prosecutions led 
smugglers to cooperate with officials, which led to more intelligence sources leading to 
more operations, arrests, and prosecutions.175 JIATF-S operations have the highest drug 
disruption/capture rate for the U.S.176 JIATF-S provides an example of aligning military, 
law enforcement, and authorities to become an effective means in confronting maritime 
security threats. Countries such as France, with legal systems infamous for being harsh 
on drug smugglers, benefit from their prosecutions. The ability to disrupt and punish has 
great implications for the Navy in managing maritime threats, but its ability to do both 
leads to some of the important gaps identified in Navy maritime security operations. 
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The second authority gap is the complexity and contradiction it creates in 
confusion for commanders. The complexity of maritime law is well recognized. It has 
been metaphorically referred to as a Rubik’s Cube denoting the complexity of required 
actions from different actors and jurisdictions needed to interact in order to obtain an 
optimal solution.177  Maritime law, combined with DoD policy, becomes ultimately more 
complex. For the Navy, this complexity can negatively affect maritime security 
operations. Felicetti and Luce’s severe assessment of the complexity of the DoD policy 
restrictions helps emphasize the affect on maritime security by stating,  
DoD policy on the Posse Comitatus Act—a set of overbroad limits that 
bear little resemblance to the actual law, combined with a bewildering 
patchwork of exceptions—impedes this important mission. It is a rotten 
legal foundation for U.S. Northern Command and creates bizarre 
situations where the U.S. Navy perceives itself to have less authority to 
conduct some national defense missions as threats get closer to 
America.178  
There is precedent for the military to self-impose law enforcement restrictions at the 
expense of the mission. Military operations during the 1992 Los Angeles riots present an 
example of this. An excerpt from Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Schnaubelt’s 
“Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots” exemplifies the point, 
The substantial reduction in military support following federalization is 
frequently attributed to legal restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus 
Act of 1878 (United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385), commonly 
referred to as Posse Comitatus. This belief, however, is erroneous. The 
Presidential Executive Order of 1 May provided JTF-LA [Joint Task Force 
Los Angeles] the authority to “restore law and order,” which included the 
performance of law enforcement activities; Posse Comitatus therefore 
could not limit the military’s options in this circumstance. Nevertheless, 
the JTF-LA commander’s mission analysis concluded that his essential 
tasks did not include the requirement to maintain law and order. 
According to Major General Marvin Covault, the JTF commander, “It was 
not the military’s mission to solve Los Angeles’s crime problem, nor were 
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we trained to do so.” The police, the public, and the media, however, 
expected the military to keep the peace rather than disengage quickly. 
In his report concerning the military and law enforcement response to the 
LA riots (The Webster Report), former Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Judge William Webster wrote: It [JTF-LA] required each 
request for assistance to be subjected to a nebulous test to determine 
whether the requested assignment constituted a law enforcement or a 
military function. As a result, after the federalization on May 1 . . . not 
only were the federal troops rendered largely unavailable for most 
assignments requested by the LAPD, but the National Guard, under 
federal command, was made subject to the same restrictions, and therefore 
had to refuse many post-federalization requests for help. 
The CANG’s [California Army National Guard] procedure for approving 
law enforcement requests had been rapid and gave maximum discretion to 
subordinate commanders to coordinate directly with the supported law 
enforcement entities. Before the establishment of JTF-LA and the 
federalization of the CANG, virtually 100 percent of law enforcement 
support requests had been approved. Following federalization, only about 
20 percent were approved.179 
Although the military could legally conduct law enforcement through a presidential 
proclamation, confusion between statutory laws and DoD policies and the military’s self-
created rules of engagement formed restrictive rules that made the use of federal and 
national assets less effective. 180  In fact, similar legal considerations have created 
concerns among operational commanders on the employment of their forces on the 
maritime domain as well, despite having the requisite authority.181 This shows that Posse 
Comitatus and DoD policy are deeply ingrained in the military psyche to the point that it 
interferes in military operations. This includes the DoD’s self-imposed extra-territorial 
restrictions to law enforcement. The legal system is sufficiently complicated that 
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commanders do not need an extra cognitive burden in deciding whether their forces can 
or cannot engage a threat. 
b. Homeland Authorities Shortfalls 
For authorities, the implications of PCA and different rules of force for 
military operating in the homeland are addressed. 
The first homeland-specific gap is that psychological implications of PCA 
reduce the likelihood of employing DoD LE exceptions. Many of the implications of the 
Posse Comitatus Act have already been discussed, but there is one more dimension to 
consider relating to homeland-specific maritime security operations. The statutory affect 
of Posse Comitatus Act is limited to U.S. territorial seas and U.S. persons, creating a 
tangible barrier between domestic operations and those abroad. Although the Navy is not 
restricted statutorily to PCA, it has psychological implications for the Navy’s 
involvement in civil affairs (law enforcement) the closer to the homeland the Navy 
operates. 182  Policy exceptions are less likely to be enacted for homeland maritime 
security missions than abroad, for fear of overstepping the military/civil divide. The 
nearest example comes from the employment of LEDETs in support of counter-
transnational criminal organization missions in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. These 
routine maritime security missions are in closest geographic proximity to the U.S., as 
well as having the greatest chance of involving U.S. persons. The largest allocation of 
LEDETs in these areas ensures appropriate legal coverage for any scenario the Navy may 
encounter.183 The existence of PCA creates an evident LE restriction line at the territorial 
sea line. The closer the Navy approaches it, the tighter the restrictions.  
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The second homeland security authority gap is that the difference between 
SROE and SRUF can create confusion over the use of force. When engaging a maritime 
security threat, it may become necessary to employ force to stop it. Due to international 
and domestic sensitivity to employment of force, any action taken “must be necessary to 
achieve a legitimate end and is reasonable under the circumstances.”184 To ensure this, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff created standing rules of engagement (SROE) and standing rules 
on the use of force (SRUF).185 The construct of SROE and SRUF may create confusion 
for the limits on the use of force in certain maritime security missions. SROE delineates 
the circumstances and limitations that military forces will initiate and/or continue combat 
engagement with enemy forces, while SRUF restrains the use of force based on sensitive 
political concerns, typically requiring the use of minimal force to stop a threat.186 In most 
cases, minimal force requires non-deadly and non-kinetic means to interrupt a threat. 
SROE is applicable to military forces outside U.S. territory (including territorial seas) and 
in HD missions.187  
Since Navy forces primarily operate outside U.S. territorial waters and do 
not operate under civil authorities, most personnel understand and are accustomed to 
SROE. SRUF applies to military forces operating in U.S. territories and/or in support of 
civil authorities.188Given that SROE is closely associated with combat, it is presumable 
that SRUF’s intent is to resemble civil law enforcement use of force standards. SRUF is 
not nearly as understood and practiced by military forces. Training and perceptual 
differences could create a problem if Navy personnel are faced with a maritime threat in 
areas of U.S. jurisdiction, such a maritime homeland security mission. The low-end 
threats posed by most maritime security threats may warrant using SRUF over SROE. 
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For example, during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, Marines and police responded to a 
domestic disturbance. After arriving at the location, the police announced themselves 
followed by a shotgun blast response. As the police readied to enter the building, they 
called to the Marines, “Cover me!” In response, the Marines fired approximately 200 
rounds through the door.189 The most appropriate action should be apprehension. Lethal 
force should only be applied out of absolute necessity. The order “cover me” to a marine 
in a combat situation means to lay down covering fire. The marines were not trained in 
law enforcement situations in 1992. For law enforcement, violence is the least desirable 
means to resolve a situation in order to minimize the disruption of society. The nature of 
the maritime security threats place maritime security operations on the seam of civil 
sensitivities, so it is imperative the Navy understands the concept that maritime security 
needs to be performed with a minimal disruption to society or commerce. This is 
something Coastguardsmen have internalized for conducting law enforcement at sea. 
Alexander Hamilton’s Letter of Instructions to the Commanding Officers of the First 
Revenue Cutters (in essence, the founding constitution of the Coast Guard) prescribes the 
qualities needed in Revenue Cutter Commanding Officers who are about to embark on 
law-enforcement missions, 
Their deportment may be marked with prudence, moderation and good 
temper…They cannot be insensible that there are some prepossessions 
against it, that the charge with which they are intrusted [sic] is a delicate 
one, and that it is easy by mismanagement, to produce serious and 
extensive clamour [sic], disgust and odium…They will always keep in 
mind that their countrymen are freemen…They will, therefore, refrain, 
with the most guarded circumspection, from whatever has the semblance 
of haughtiness, rudeness, or insult…They will endeavor to overcome 
difficulties, if any are experienced, by a cool and temperate perseverance 
in their duty--by address and moderation, rather than by vehemence or 
violence.190 
Awareness of the sensitivities involved in law enforcement is essential, especially when 
involving U.S. persons. 
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If a Navy asset is single-handedly faced with a hostile maritime security 
threat involving U.S. persons or in U.S. territory, how do the legal limits affect the rules 
for the use of force? The minimum required use of force is apprehension. If the Navy 
does not have the authority to apprehend, unless for self-defense purposes, then the 
perpetrator cannot be prosecuted and may be set free. In addition, if the minimal use of 
force is required, what legal protections do Navy members have? For example, it is a 
federal crime to harm a federal officer while they are attempting to enforce the law, 
which provides incentive not to harm boarding team members and it allows the expansion 
of U.S. jurisdiction, if needed.191 The Coast Guard is also covered by indemnity during 
operations in situations where they have to fire at or into a vessel.192 If something were to 
happen during the course of stopping a vessel, they are not liable for criminal charges and 
damages. For the Navy, which draws many of its protections from the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC), many maritime security threat scenarios are not considered armed 
conflict scenarios, so LOAC protection is not extended to the Navy. Protections and 
indemnity provide extra incentives for illegal actors to cooperate and reduce the risk 
aversion to commanding officers and crews in involvement in a law enforcement 
operation. 
There are counter points to the SROE/SRUF confusion argument. There 
are no indicators or case studies to show the Navy is unable to operate under the minimal 
use of force. The operating areas normally place the Navy outside U.S. territorial seas 
and only a small fraction of world shipping falls under U.S. jurisdiction, so the chances of 
being directly involved in a SRUF scenario is small. In some instances, the U.S. can 
create a military jurisdiction to overcome some of these obstacles. In support of OEF and 
OIF, the U.S. created legally sanctioned exclusion zones that allowed the Navy to 
conduct military maritime security activities under the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC). 193  Another part of this is possibly due to the design of standard boarding 
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capabilities. Standard Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams, for example, train 
for only Level I (compliant) and Level II (noncompliant, low freeboard) boarding. Both 
are presumably nonviolent or nonhostile, so the teams rarely approach a boarding 
scenario with the need to apply force. If so, then force should be employed for defense 
only. If a boarding is suspected to be Level III or IV (noncompliant, high freeboard or 
hostile respectively), then specialized boarding teams will be used.194 Many argue that 
the military should not have to make the distinction between minimal force and 
proportional force because the distraction of minimal force will degrade the lethality of 
military forces. 195 The lessons of the last two decades have clearly shown the military 
needs to be sensitive to operating in both lethal force and minimal force operating 
environments. 
PCA and use of force rules present unique gaps for homeland maritime 
security missions. Psychological implications from PCA may reduce the willingness to 
place Navy assets in law enforcement roles the closer to the homeland they operate. 
Different rules for the use of force that also apply to the Navy is that they are operating in 
U.S. territorial waters and against U.S. persons. Commanders and their crews may find a 
situation difficult to reconcile what force to apply, especially if restricted by legal 
authorities. Although most maritime security scenarios will probably be benign, 
situations that do escalate could agitate political sensitivities, if Navy forces are not well  
versed in both applying violent and nonviolent means to stop a threat. This is especially 
true if Navy operations focus on the littorals, where interaction with nations and people 
increase. 
c. Overseas Authorities Gap 
The contradiction between domestic law restrictions and DoD policy and 
international/customary law creates an authorities gap for overseas operations. Bilateral 
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and multilateral agreements are excellent for expanding jurisdictions to enable maritime 
forces to conduct MSO. The Navy is not regularly included in these agreements, 
preventing them from having the jurisdiction to confront maritime threats on vessels and 
people from foreign countries. 
The authority gap for international maritime security is that U.S. domestic 
laws restrict the Navy authorities given by international law. Without the support, 
domestic laws that allow the Navy to enforce federal law, many of the international 
initiatives to confront threats are rendered useless. This is because most UN conventions 
and protocols are not self-executing, and therefore, rely on domestic laws to make them 
applicable, 196  nor do they place most maritime security threats under universal 
jurisdiction. The suppression of piracy is an example where U.S. law allows the Navy to 
participate, and the suppression of international narcotics provides an example where the 
lack of U.S. law prohibits Navy participation.197  
Since the Navy cannot enforce federal law, it precludes the Navy from 
enforcing most conventions and protocols, unlike the Coast Guard’s Title 14 USC 89 
authority, which specifically allows the Coast Guard to enforce federal laws. It is likely 
that the Senate’s intent in favoring existing U.S. law was to preserve U.S. sovereignty 
rights and federalist ideals,198 not to deliberately prevent Navy action. Consequently, 
domestic laws and policies diminish the intent of international law to combat maritime 
threats. It also creates a double standard for different threats. If the Navy can legally 
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combat piracy, then why not the other internationally recognized maritime threats? If the 
IMO and international law of the sea promote and protect American ideals and interest of 
good order and freedom of the seas, then by restricting the Navy’s enforcement 
authorities, the U.S. is missing an opportunity to increase its role in promoting and 
enforcing those standards. Greater participation in the international maritime security 
regime will become increasingly important if the world security regime is becoming more 
inclusive, multilateral, and consensual.199 
Authority gaps clearly exist in the Navy’s maritime security operations. 
The legal authority gap unquestionably prevents the Navy from directly addressing the 
majority of maritime threats. Even with interagency help, the LEA capacity gap creates 
the potential for missed opportunities for the majority of Navy units operating 
independently. Increasing the legal authorities of the Navy can also diminish some 
operational legal concerns about the Navy operating in a law enforcement capacity, 
whether it is for homeland security missions, civil support, or global maritime security 
operations. As future threats continue to blur the line between civil and military, 
operational commanders need not only have the proper authorities, but a better 
understanding of them.  
2. Capability  
The most important maritime security capability deficiency for the Navy is the 
proficiency and skills needed in LE training, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). This is 
understandable because, normally, the Navy is not tasked to conduct law enforcement 
training. As such, this section will show deficiencies in the Navy’s doctrine, operations, 
training, manning, leadership and facilities (DOTMLPF) framework for enabling law 
enforcement TTPs. As maritime security threats increase, the Navy finds itself more and 
more involved in LE-related tasks, so it becomes more important to develop the 
necessary skills to increase efficiency in maritime security. Since these skills deficiencies 
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are applicable to all MSO, there is no discussion specifically relating to the homeland vs. 
overseas. 
a. General MSO Capability Deficiencies 
All of the irregular challenges studies stress the Navy’s lack of training 
and focus on maritime security and stability missions,200 despite regular involvement in 
them. The NWDC’s CIC study summarizes the substantial findings from the other studies 
by stating,  
the Navy lacks an overarching institutionalized pre-deployment training 
for IW [irregular warfare]. The most ready comparison was made with the 
well institutionalized pre-deployment training done for traditional warfare 
missions…which have clearly defined training curricula, performance 
standards, and pre-deployment qualifications…pre-deployment training 
lacks the same rigor for confronting irregular challenges.201 
Training and experience play an important role in developing the proper skills for 
maritime security. Law enforcement-related missions, in particular, require specialized 
skills to collect evidence and follow criminal procedures.202 In fact, poor training and 
lack of expertise in law enforcement missions were the principal concerns that arose 
when the Navy was almost given law enforcement authority during the 1980s “War on 
Drugs” debates.203 Ironically, the Navy is no stranger to boarding operations that are 
similar to law enforcement missions. In fact, by 2005, the Navy conducted over 10,300 
boardings in the CENTCOM AOR alone. 204  For an organization with so much 
experience, why are its proficiency and skills considered a gap? The answer lies mostly 
within the doctrine, operations, training, manning, leadership and facilities (DOTMLPF) 
framework.  
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The first capabilities deficiency is that the Navy lacks formal doctrine for 
LE. Navy doctrine for maritime law enforcement is mostly absent. 205  This is 
understandable because it is generally prohibited from direct involvement in law 
enforcement activities. The Navy’s Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) doctrine 
resembles maritime law enforcement doctrine, because they employ similar techniques. 
They differ because MIO is military and political in nature and not law enforcement. Law 
enforcement focuses on maintaining good order based on law. 206  Most MIOs are 
militarily enforced barriers (or in essence a quarantine blockade) into or out of a nation or 
specified area to disrupt the flow of specific items (ships and cargo) to politically compel 
a country or group.207 There is no true intention for law enforcement. In consequence, 
enforcement is selective; quickly disrupting or stopping the threat is favored over long-
term solutions, and intelligence exploitation is favored over evidence collection and case 
packages. A member of JIATF-S summarizes the military’s intent well: “DoD wants to 
terminate its involvement as soon after detection as possible… in order to create an 
appropriate distance from the prosecution of the suspects and stay off the witness 
stand.”208 Anti-piracy and counter narco-terrorism operations changed the nature of MIO, 
by introducing undeniable law enforcement elements into the operations. This posed a 
problem for the Navy, because little was available for inexperienced crews to determine 
specific requirements needed for law enforcement missions. There are several 
documented cases where the lack evidence precluded prosecutions. 209  The lack of 
doctrine prompted the Navy’s Fifth Fleet, with the help of NCIS, to create specific anti-
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piracy guidelines, CONOPS, and an EXORD to draw attention to those specific 
requirements.210  
The second capabilities deficiency is that The Navy’s interdiction training 
does not focus on search, seizure, and evidence collection TTPs. As mentioned earlier, 
boarding is the most fundamental activity in maritime security operations. Navy Visit, 
Board, Search, Seizure training lacks the emphasis on law enforcement techniques and 
procedures. The Non-Compliant Boarding, Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Team 
Trainer course of instruction (NCB-VBSS COI), the basic mandatory course for all 
VBSS team members, only dedicates two hours of the 122 dedicated training hours to 
document inspection, search techniques, and evidence collection.211 The course focuses 
mainly on the tactical boarding techniques.212 VBSS Boarding Officers receive slightly 
more training over the course their additional four-day school in conjunction with the 
NCB-VBSS COI.213 Following initial training, Navy requirements list no further training 
in document inspection, search techniques, and evidence collection.214 The proficiency 
and depth of training becomes an individual unit endeavor. The focus on tactical 
techniques and procedures, while undoubtedly important, is only one part of boarding. 
The ability to conduct inquiries, proper searches, and intelligence collection is just as 
important, if not more so, because they are the core tasks of a boarding that will 
determine the outcome. Without proper training on both, boarding becomes a motion 
without substance, decreasing effectiveness. The CIC Study by John Hopkins University 
agrees, concluding the lack of specialized training for VBSS missions is a major 
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deficiency in maritime security operations.215 The outcome of the cases for the USS 
Nichols and USS Ashland pirate incidents presented in Chapter I help illustrate that point, 
where the former ship had LEA assistance and the latter did not. Access to the expertise 
and training from Coast Guard and NCIS agents can play a key role in building 
proficiency for VBSS teams.216 
The third capability deficiency is that the organizational and manning 
structure prevents long-term skills development. Even with some training and gained 
operational experience, the requisite skills can atrophy with sporadic employment 
stemming from the multi-mission nature of Navy units. The organizational and manning 
structure for VBSS and NECC maritime security units does not allow for long-term 
critical skills retention. For example, VBSS is a collateral duty, so it competes for time 
and attention with primary duties and other mission areas.217 In addition, the standard 
crew rotation rate assures quick turnover of team members, therefore precluding expertise 
buildup. The NECC suffers from the same issues, because traditionally oriented career 
paths and incentives reduce long-term dedicated expertise.218A recent policy paper from 
Brookings claims that similar problems afflict standard multi-mission Coast Guard units, 
despite a more robust LE boarding program and operational experience.219 To help with 
this issue, the Coast Guard created the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement 
Academy in 2004 and the Maritime Enforcement Specialist rate in 2010 to support “the 
standardization and professionalism of the Coast Guard’s entire Maritime Law 
Enforcement Training System.”220   If it is an issue for the Coast Guard, it can only be 
expected to be worse for the Navy who does not engage in these operations on the scale 
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of the Coast Guard. This expertise/proficiency shortfall prompted three studies to 
recommend the creation of a specialty expeditionary warfare career path that would 
encompass and promote the critical skills needed for these types of missions.221 
The Navy does not have the proficiency and skills required to employ the 
law enforcement TTPs effectively. As law enforcement, it is not a Navy mission; it was 
reasonable for the Navy to assume it did not originally need to create those skills. But, the 
changing nature of the maritime domain places the Navy directly into law enforcement 
roles. Therefore, it is essential to embrace law enforcement TTPs in order to improve 
maritime security operations. The Navy’s current DOTMLPF framework further hinders 
development of the proficiency skills needed. The Navy is attempting to address some 
DOTMPLF issues with respect to maritime security, but none of the initiatives are 
incorporating law enforcement in the solution.222  
3. Capacity  
Maritime security threats, such as transnational crime, terrorism, and illegal 
fishing, are considered low-end threats. In MSO, capacity is a critical factor to defeat 
low-end/high probability threats, as compared to traditional war, where capability is more 
important to defeat high-end/high-consequence threats. Low-end threats (fishing/cargo 
vessels, small boats, and small arms) are relatively inexpensive (compared to warships) 
and simplistic, therefore increasing the likelihood and quantity of occurrence. The larger 
number of threats requires greater capacity numbers to defeat it. Figure 2 illustrates this 
point.  
Even though capacity is the most important factor in dealing with maritime 
security threats, maritime LE platform capacity (and the funding to support it) is also the 
chief gap in maritime security. Navies and Coast Guards are expensive because they are 
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material intensive and require specialized platforms and skills in order to operate on the 
maritime domain. 223  Their relative expense has decreased their numbers (capacity). 
Because of the expense and subsequent smaller capacities of naval vessels in most 
countries, most navies and coast guards are combined in order to maximize capacity and 
capability.224 Nevertheless, there are simply not enough law enforcement platforms to 
adequately cover the maritime domain where maritime security threats can operate. Since 
resource capacity presents a generic gap every agency and nation faces, it will be 
understood as a consistent challenge in this discussion of capacity shortfalls.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Spectrum of Conflict, Crime, and Crises225 
This section will cover important capacity gaps that effect either Navy MSO 
and/or general maritime security.  
a. General MSO Capacity Shortfall 
The issues affecting general MSO means the issues are applicable to 
maritime security to the entire maritime domain, whether in the homeland or overseas. 
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There are two problems affecting LE restrictions: First, the Navy’s LE restrictions 
intensify the existing capacity shortfall. Second, there is not enough interagency LE 
capacity to support Navy MSO. 
The first capacity shortfall is that the Navy’s LE restrictions intensify the 
existing capacity shortfall. While the naval capacity gap is a generic problem, the United 
States has a different capacity gap that is alterable. The U.S. naval division of labor, 
which divides the naval services into military (Navy and Marine Corps) and maritime law 
enforcement (Coast Guard), creates an artificial maritime LE capacity gap. The Navy has 
a large quantity of ships (high capacity), but cannot employ them to fully and legally 
confront a majority of maritime security threats, because the Navy is restricted from 
conducting maritime LE (Figure 1). As such, the difference between the Navy’s capacity 
and the entire U.S. Naval capacity is defined as the maritime security capacity gap. By 
expanding the Navy’s law enforcement authorities and capabilities, it can close that 
capacity gap.  
How can the Navy affect the overall maritime security capacity gaps? If 
numbers count, then the Navy’s relatively large size could greatly increase the capacity 
for both homeland defense and the entire maritime global domain. An average of 55 
percent of the U.S. Navy’s 285 battle force ships is underway or deployed on any given 
day, making them potentially available to conduct MSO and/or presence operations.226 
About three-quarters of the average total are forward-deployed in support of operations 
abroad.227  If these ships were law enforcement capable, the U.S. contribution to global 
maritime law enforcement capacity would increase by approximately 200 percent.228 
The second shortfall is there is not enough interagency LE capacity to 
support Navy MSO. Since the Navy does not have LE capabilities and authorities, the 
U.S. attempts to cover the maritime capacity gap by utilizing interagency LE support for 
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them. The Coast Guard and NCIS are the primary agencies that provide direct LE support 
to the Navy. The limited capacity of both agencies is insufficient to fully cover Navy 
assets potentially involved in maritime security. This problem affects the Navy for both 
the homeland and overseas maritime security operations. The next few paragraphs will 
look at the capacity of Law Enforcement Detachments (the primary Coast Guard support 
units to Navy vessels) and NCIS’s deployable Special Agents to supply Navy assets with 
LE authorities. 
The LEDET program is the main interagency support mechanism by 
which the Coast Guard supplies the Navy. The entire LEDETs program consists of 18 
teams with 12 personnel each.229 Splitting the teams is common to provide coverage for 
more ships.230 The designed operational employment time of those teams is 120 days a 
year, but due to high demand, deployment days can average 205 to 210 days per year.231 
Even with extended deployment times and training, crew fatigue, and refit requirements 
mean only half of those teams are available at any time to support operations worldwide. 
Currently, the Coast Guard provides 7.5 teams to support operations in different areas of 
operation (two teams for USCENTCOM and five and one half teams for 
USSOUTHCOM).232 This means that even split, LEDETs can only provide a coverage 
rate of roughly 10 percent for the average number of Navy Battle Force Ships underway 
or forward deployed.233 Seven and a half teams are not enough to cover the demands 
from other combatant commanders. AFRICOM, EUCOM, and PACOM each require an 
additional two LEDETs (for six total extra teams) to support operations in their AORs, 
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but they rarely get them.234 This helps highlight the importance of the maritime security 
mission in the different AORs and the needs for proper authorities, skills, and capabilities 
to support MSO. That is nearly double the current amount available.  
The Coast Guard provides more support than just LEDETs for Navy 
operations. For example, The Navy has a limited inventory of patrol craft, which forces 
the Navy to utilize the Coast Guard’s small boats and cutters in overseas maritime 
security missions. Patrol craft are critical to maritime security missions, such as 
infrastructure defense, high value asset escorting, and other near-shore operations that 
large combatants cannot do.235 This capacity gap also applies to TSC missions where 
Coast Guard platforms are more appropriate for most partner nations’ naval services.236  
In 2010, the Coast Guard continued the deployment of six patrol boats, port security 
units, LEDETs and their supporting and command elements to CENTCOM. It deployed 
cutters to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to support partner capacity building programs 
and maritime exercises. In all, it delivered maritime capacity-building assistance to 51 
nations, and training to 2,503 host country participants.237 Budget cuts threaten to reduce 
Coast Guard support for overseas assistance and TSC.238 If the Navy was to lose the 
support of the Coast Guard’s small cutters for maintenance or budget reasons, the Navy 
simply does not have enough patrol boats to cover them.239 Loss of the Coast Guard’s six 
patrol boats would reduce Navy’s patrol boat presence by 54 percent.240 It will take the 
Navy’s entire remaining patrol boat inventory to make up for the redistribution of Coast 
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Guard assets.241 The loss of the Coast Guard’s unique capabilities and capacity will prove  
a blow to the Navy’s overseas maritime security efforts. Without expanding the capacity 
of Coast Guard forces, the Navy will need to determine a new way to replace the Coast 
Guard’s support. 
Since NCIS also provides support to Navy in law enforcement roles, what 
capacity does it have to support the Navy? Usually, NCIS assigns one agent to every 
aircraft carrier and “big-deck” amphibious vessel, 242  which can potentially provide 
coverage for entire battle groups attached to large deck vessels. Attached Special Agents, 
if leveraged smartly, potentially provide coverage over a sizeable percentage of deployed 
ships. NCIS can also expand support to security hotspots by deploying additional agents. 
Three things can negate this effect: First, it is common for ships to operate outside the 
immediate vicinity of the large deck vessels carrying NCIS agents, so extensive logistical 
support may be needed to move agents between ships. Second, beforehand knowledge of 
a potential operation is needed to ensure a Special Agent on scene prior to execution. 
This precludes the agent from use in emergent scenarios. Third, the NCIS agents primary 
responsibility is internal criminal investigations and counter-intelligence, so directly 
supporting MSO missions may unduly detract from their primary responsibilities.  
The capacity to deploy agents to specially support emergent maritime law 
enforcement scenarios is also severely limited. For instance, NCIS’s “surge” of specially 
deployed agents to support anti-piracy operations consists of one ship-rider and one land-
based agent at Navy Forces Central Command in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility.243 
Ironically, expanded NCIS support is specifically covering one of the few maritime 
security missions where the Navy does not need expanded legal authorities. The intent of 
NCIS support must be to leverage its investigative expertise due to the criminal nature of 
these cases. This means one agent is available for the four to eight Navy ships that 
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conduct counter-piracy operations on a daily basis,244 further showing the limitation of 
NCIS capacity to cover the gap law enforcement authorities. Further surging special 
agents for ship-rider deployments would negatively affect NCIS operations. 
b. Homeland MSO Capacity Shortfall 
Having the capacity to conduct direct operations is imperative to achieving 
maritime homeland security. As the National Strategy for Maritime Security states,  
The United States must… patrol, monitor, and exert unambiguous control 
over its maritime borders and maritime approaches. At-sea presence 
reassures U.S. citizens, deters adversaries and lawbreakers, provides better 
mobile surveillance coverage, adds to warning time, allows seizing the 
initiative to influence events at a distance, and facilitates the capability to 
surprise and engage adversaries well before they can cause harm to the 
United States.245 
Since the Navy’s role is severely limited in maritime homeland security, due to legal 
authorities and capabilities, the Coast Guard (as lead agent and only naval service able to 
legally conduct homeland MSO) and its capacity gap or shortfall becomes the focus of 
this section. Understanding any Coast Guard capacity shortfall is important because it 
reduces the effectiveness of homeland MSO and highlights areas where the Navy large 
ship capacity can be used to potentially reduce those gaps. For example, in FY 2009 
warships utilizing LEDETs accounted for over 50 percent of cocaine interdictions for that 
year.246 Mass migration events quickly overwhelm Coast Guard capacity, requiring Navy 
vessels to support migration interdictions. 247 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the 
Navy surged ships to provide security and defense of critical areas on the East and West 
Coasts.248 The point is to show the value of the Navy’s capacity in terms of providing 
maritime governance for the homeland. 
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The first homeland capacity shortfall is that the Coast Guard’s capacity is 
too small to homeland MSO requirements. Deservingly, the Coast Guard has long touted 
its unofficial motto “doing more with less,” referring to the Coast Guard’s small size and 
its large mission set. 249 Despite “doing more with less,” the U.S. Coast Guard’s capacity 
is insufficient to meet all of its routine security obligations. A study conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School determined that the lack of maritime enforcement capacity is 
a major factor in the vulnerability of the U.S. west coast ports.250 The study models 
various scenarios where intelligence is received that an unidentified vessel possesses a 
kinetic risk to a major port with 96 hours advance notice. The study’s analysis 
highlighted the current and even future projected availability of assets and boarding 
teams as too little to effectively identify and stop the threat.251 Another study evaluating 
the Coast Guard’s force structure, conducted by RAND Corp., concurs, concluding that 
the Coast Guard’s current and projected assets are only half of what is required to satisfy  
its “routine” missions.252 The inability for the Coast Guard to meet all of its homeland 
security requirements, due to limited capacity, creates vulnerability in America’s waters 
and its approaches. 
The second homeland capacity shortfall is that the Coast Guard has a 
limited amount of ships with offshore capability. Geographical distances play an 
important part in the Coast Guard’s capability to conduct maritime security missions. 
Designed as primarily a coastal force, its capacity dramatically decreases the further the 
distance away from the U.S. coastline.253 If the United States’ goal is to confront threats 
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as far from the homeland as possible,254 a smaller law enforcement capacity has negative 
implications in the ability to address those threats. Within U.S. territorial waters (twelve 
nautical miles (nm)), the Coast Guard has roughly 2,100 cutters and boats that can 
potentially respond to threats.255 By 200 nm, (the limit of the U.S. Economic Exclusive 
Zone), that number decreases to 250 vessels. That translates to one LE capable vessel for 
every 14,000 sq. nm of the U.S. EEZ.256 The Coast Guard operates approximately eighty 
vessels (including thirty buoy tenders and four icebreakers that do not normally function 
as security assets) capable of effectively operating long distances off the U.S. Coast.  
To help conceptualize the time and distance versus capacity problem, a 
U.S. bound vessel over 300 tons coming from overseas must submit a Notice of Arrival 
(NOA) at least 96 hours prior to arrival in U.S. waters.257 Vessels smaller than 300 tons 
(including recreational boats and other small craft) are not required to submit a NOA. 
With the rare exception of prior intelligence, a NOA provides the Coast Guard with the 
first “awareness” of the arriving vessel. Depending on the vessel’s speed, this initial 
awareness could be as far as 1900 nm away.258 At this distance, few Coast Guard assets 
are available to track and, if necessary, interdict the vessel in an attempt to address a 
potential threat as far from the homeland as possible. If the vessel arrives in the U.S. 
EEZ, it can reach the U.S. coastline in as little as 10 hours.259 Within the EEZ, the Coast 
Guard has more assets (still one asset for every 14,000 sq. nm) able to track and interdict 
a suspect vessel, but the available time to interdict (from 96 hours to 10 hours) is 
significantly reduced. At the territorial seas mark, the Coast Guard may have less than 45 
minutes to react before a threat reaches the U.S. coastline. Now consider the 1,200 to 
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1,500 commercial vessels calling on American ports daily. 260  This exacerbates the 
challenges of response time and distance to enforce laws on the seas. Since it better to 
confront maritime security threats as far from the coast as possible, the Coast Guard 
limited vessel capacity, especially for threats immediately offshore, is constrained to 
address time and distance problems adequately. 
The third homeland capacity shortfall is that material, budget, and mission 
load issues threaten the Coast Guard’s capacity. Outside of a “routine” capacity gap, 
other challenges threaten to further impact Coast Guard capacity. These include an aging 
fleet, impending budget reductions, and significant events and disasters. A recent GAO 
report highlights the expected reduction in mission performance in security operations as 
a trade-off required to balance resources between security and non-security missions.261  
The fleet’s material condition directly attributes to the low performance in the defense 
readiness mission in support of COCOMs requirements.262 The Coast Guard plans “to 
cut about 1,000 personnel in fiscal [year] 2013, as well as decommission high-endurance 
cutters and patrol boats, in the face of tighter budgets.” 263 DHS Inspector General’s 
performance reports from years with significant events, like the Haiti disaster relief and 
Horizon oil spill negatively impacted performance in other maritime security areas 
increasing the vulnerability of the U.S.264 The changing security environment will only 
continue to exacerbate the shortfall in capacity. To address the effects of capacity 
reductions on its mission performance, the Coast Guard is lowering performance target 
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262 The report reflects the expected impact to operations decommissioning of 5 High Endurance 
Cutters, 9 aircraft, and 5 MSSTs. GAO, Observations on the Requested Fiscal Year 2011 Budget, Past 
Performance, and Current Challenges, 11. 
263 John C. Marcario, “Coast Guard To Cut Some Personnel to Pay for New Assets” Seapower 
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goals for the next fiscal year.265 These problems have started discussions amongst Coast 
Guard leadership in scaling back current overseas support operations as a trade-off to 
bolster its operational capacity issues in the homeland.266 If the Coast Guard does reduce 
current support for DoD operations, it will increase the capacity gap in the interagency 
support to the Navy and potentially generate greater threats originating from overseas. 
c. Overseas MSO Capacity Gaps 
The unique capacity gap overseas is the need for the Navy to supply 
critical maritime leadership and naval capacity to overseas maritime security operations. 
Restricted LE roles reduce the value of the Navy performing these roles, despite the 
importance of maritime security to partner nations. Since only a small fraction of the  
Coast Guard’s ocean-going vessels regularly operates outside the immediate vicinity of 
the United States,267 the Coast Guard is unable to fill the Navy’s place in supporting LE 
efforts abroad. 
The overseas capacity shortfall is that the Navy cannot employ its ships in 
law enforcement roles, despite the large participation in international MSO. The Navy’s 
forward presence plays an important role in providing stability, security, and freedom of 
the seas. As NOC 2010 states, “The forward presence of naval forces serves to contain 
and deter regional adversaries while increasing the engagement opportunities with allies 
and partners to promote collective security, enhance global stability and confront 
irregular challenges.” 268  Some activities include maritime interception operations in 
support of UN Security Resolutions (UNSRs), where U.S. assets comprised the largest 
and sustained capacity to enforce sanctions. Imposing the UN sanctioned Iraq Oil 
Embargo in the Persian Gulf from 1990–2003 provides an excellent historical 
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example.269 Maritime security operations outside of UN mandates also exist. Combined 
U.S. and Indian Navy anti-piracy and terrorism suppression patrols in the Malacca 
Strait,270 and the ongoing U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces patrols supporting MSO 
in Middle Eastern waters and the Indian Ocean provide other examples.  
The U.S. Navy also leads other programs that promote security and 
stability, such as Theater Security Cooperation, Maritime Security Force Assistance 
(MSFA), and global maritime partnership (GMP) engagement missions.271 In 2009, the 
USS Crommlein combined its transit across the Pacific, embarking Coast Guard 
personnel, to go through U.S. and regional partner EEZs in Oceania to provide counter-
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing patrols. The small island nations, most 
of whom have severely limited patrol boat capacity to cover their large EEZs, 272 
welcomed the combined Navy patrol. It went a long way in showing U.S. commitment to 
its presence and upholding maritime law. 273  As the Naval War College’s Irregular 
Challenges Game 2010 states, “the Navy may be better suited to overcome the barriers to 
interdicting and engaging in order to confront irregular challenges before they escalate to 
crisis since the Navy is forward-deployed and maintains presence on a persistent basis to 
preempt a crisis or set conditions to effectively react.” 274 The ability to harness the 
Navy’s capacity against the entire spectrum of maritime threats across the maritime 
domain plays an important role in enabling global stability and security. Global stability 
and security, in turn create stability and security for the United States. 
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C. INDIRECT APPROACH OPERATIONS  
Indirect approach operations are operations that do not directly attempt to 
confront threats. Instead, indirect operations either improve direct operations, and/or they 
can take measures to reduce the threat burden. Two good examples of indirect approach 
operations are maritime domain awareness (MDA)/intelligence and theater security 
cooperation (TSC). MDA is extremely important because it helps maritime security by 
“preventing crimes before they occur and allocating law enforcement resources more 
deliberately and effectively.” 275  Since there is sufficient literature that covers the 
problems associated with information sharing between military and law enforcement 
organizations, this part of the chapter will only cover TSC by indentifying and analyzing 
the capacity, capability, and authority gaps with respect to law enforcement roles. 
1. Theater Security Cooperation 
The Navy’s key strategy to defeat maritime challenges is TSC with international 
partners.276 These partners will, in turn, prevent the spread of terrorism, insurgencies, and 
criminal activities from their origins. Despite the TSC’s goal of building partner capacity, 
the Navy’s approach to TSC is mismatched to its goal. The Navy’s approach fosters 
diplomatic access and coalition building, rather than building partner capacity. Most 
nations that participate in TSC focus exclusively on building constabulary capacity for its 
roles (Figure 3). The Navy’s different focus from partner nations is directly attributable to 
its capacity, capability and authority gaps in TSC.  
a. Capacity 
The capacity gap for the Navy in TSC is the lack of specialized forces 
with maritime security expertise. In the Naval Warfare Development Center’s CIC study, 
NECC units were closer in providing relevant maritime security expertise, but their small 
size formed a capacity shortfall to overcome the Navy’s general lack of expertise.277 
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NECC’s maritime security capable units consist of approximately 8,000 personnel 
supporting both fleet operations and security training.278 Only 300 personnel support 
Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) teams, who have the primary 
responsibility of training partner nations in maritime security. 279   NECC’s limited 
capacity is in further danger of reductions with pending budget cuts. Most of NECC’s 
funding comes from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds in support of OEF 
and OIF.280 When those contingency operations are completed, it is unlikely the extra 
funding will be available to continue supporting the current size and operations of the 
NECC. 
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Figure 3.   U.S. Navy and Potential Partner Views for the Purpose of TSC281 
b. Capability 
Related to NECC capacity, the Navy’s traditional capabilities offer little to 
most recipients of TSC. The Navy is seldom directly involved in constabulary duties, 
such as fishery enforcement, counter-trafficking, and pollution control. In addition to the 
roles, most Navy assets are high-end platforms that possess exceptional technology and 
equipment that are beyond the purchasing capability of most TSC nations. Coast Guard 
officials also expressed concern about the knowledge and expertise of the Navy units 
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performing law enforcement training for Africa Partnership Station visits.282 Capabilities 
that cannot be used against to address partner challenges will be discounted.283 When 
looking at the makeup of the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) 
team who are responsible for training partner nations on “port operations, harbor and 
channel maintenance and construction, marine and fishery resources, international law 
(admiralty) and public health”284 the bulk of the Maritime Civil Affairs teams consist of 
“active duty and reserve Sailors from the construction force ratings… as well as 
boatswain’s mates (BM), hospital corpsmen (HM), information technology specialists 
(IT) and electronic technicians (ET).”285 These Navy ratings clearly do not coincide with 
civil maritime functions. Since the Navy does not conduct these missions, it is difficult to 
argue that the Navy can provide functional expertise to civil maritime areas decreasing 
the effectiveness of TSC.  
The Navy has admitted some of those concerns by embarking interagency 
and international officials to help cover some of the expertise and legal gaps.286 Without 
the practical constabulary experience and equipment, the Navy provides only limited 
value to TSC. In most cases, the ship crews can only instruct on basic skills, like 
maintenance, damage control, and seamanship.287 Some countries, like Ghana, require 
only basic training because they do not have naval forces that get underway regularly. 
Other countries, like Nigeria, have basic seamanship and equipment competency but 
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require maritime security skills training. 288  A Coast Guard crew can provide skills 
training for the both countries, but Navy can only provide for the former. 
c. Authority 
An advantage maritime law enforcement entities have is the “white hull” 
vessel access that most Navy “gray hulls” do not. A negative perception of the military 
compared to law enforcement is the suspected culprit.289 The reasons for the Navy’s 
exclusion are discussed further in the next chapter. The Coast Guard has leveraged its law 
enforcement authorities in order to actively partner with many nations including, Canada, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation to improve “multilateral 
maritime security and increase cooperation in enforcing fisheries treaties, combating 
illegal drug trafficking and illegal migration.”290 The Coast Guard also is working with 
the People’s Republic of China for a variety of maritime security issues.291 For the U.S. 
Navy, these types of exchanges with China are minimal. The preponderance law 
enforcement bilateral agreements in Latin America also provide evidence of the Coast 
Guard’s LE access. Perhaps the Navy, by approaching partner countries and regions from 
a law enforcement posture, can create greater opportunities for access and cooperation.292 
For example, the LEDET program has allowed the Navy direct access and participation 
in regionally sensitive areas through law enforcement bilateral/multilateral agreements. If  
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sizeable portions of our partners are willing to allow access to Navy forces, acting in a 
law enforcement capacity, it can prove beneficial to the maritime security operations and 
TSC. 
The Navy plays an integral role in providing MSO abroad. Maritime 
security is the most important consideration for the majority of the world’s navies. If the 
U.S. Navy wants to be recognized as a significant partner by these navies, it must 
continue to participate in maritime security activities, and it needs to be enabled to 
conduct law enforcement in order to participate effectively in maritime security activities 
with partner navies. 
D. CONCLUSION 
1. Direct Approach 
Directly enforcing maritime security requires authorities, capabilities, and 
capacities. Since law enforcement is the best method to counter the criminal nature of 
maritime security threats, having the right LE authorities and capabilities, as well as the 
capacity to employ them, is important to conduct maritime security well. Any gap, 
shortfall, and/or deficiency in those requirements is considered a vulnerability in 
maritime security. There are several vulnerabilities in maritime security directly 
attributable to the Navy’s limited law enforcement capabilities and authorities. Since the 
Navy has limited law enforcement authorities and capabilities, it cannot effectively 
employ its capacity to reduce the maritime security threat.  
a. Authority 
The Navy’s actual and perceived legal and policy restrictions (limited 
authority) negatively affect what maritime security threats it can confront and how it can 
confront them. The Navy’s current authorities allow it to challenge only a small 
percentage of maritime security threats without the help of other law enforcement 
agencies. Even if the Navy has the authority to disrupt/stop a threat, with very few 




offenders). The ability to punish criminals through prosecution has proven to improve 
MSO by obtaining intelligence for follow-on operations and creating deterrence for 
maritime criminal activities. 
The maritime legal regime and military policies create complicated and 
contradictory rules that can affect the decision-making process for the Navy. It can create 
the perception that commanders may not have the authorities they actually do, creating 
risk aversion to employing military units in fear of the legal ramifications. Expanding 
legal authorities will help alleviate the risk aversion due to legal ramifications and reduce 
the angst caused by the complex legal system. At the same time, it will grow awareness 
for the different needs between combat and peace/law enforcement missions, including 
the use of force, making the Navy adept to the varying needs of the security environment. 
b. Capability 
The Navy’s largest deficiency in maritime security is the limited training 
and expertise of its members (limited capability) in maritime law enforcement. Since the 
Navy rarely conducted law enforcement missions, it had no need to develop those 
capabilities. Consequently, it has negatively impacted the Navy’s increasing involvement 
in MSO. The Navy is slowly recognizing the need to improve its maritime security 
capabilities, but none of those improvements includes espousal of law enforcement skills. 
In addition, the Navy’s current DOTMLPF framework is also prohibiting improvement in 
its maritime security proficiency. Without accepting the need for law enforcement skill 
and the subsequent changes to its organizations, the Navy will continue to conduct MSO 
inefficiently. 
c. Capacity 
The most significant and common gap in maritime security is having 
enough capacity to adequately protect the maritime domain. It affects most 
navies/coastguards overseas, as well as the Coast Guard for the U.S. homeland, creating a 
significant vulnerability in maritime security. The Navy’s large number of ships (large 
capacity) cannot solve the maritime domain’s maritime security capacity problem alone, 
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but through its global presence it can help to reduce the gap both at home and overseas. 
While the Navy has a large capacity of ships to conduct and support numerous maritime 
security operations, it cannot employ them efficiently to confront the full spectrum of 
maritime security threats, because of the limited training and expertise of its members 
(limited capability), and because of its perception of legal and policy restrictions (limited 
authority). Greater investment into law enforcement roles can help ameliorate the 
maritime security capacity gap. In order to help cover those deficiencies and shortfalls, 
the Navy relies on the interagency support from the Coast Guard and NCIS. The Coast 
Guard has essentially the opposite set of constraints than the Navy. Its members are 
highly trained in maritime security and law enforcement (high capability); and its legal 
authorities are extensive and clearly defined (broad authority), but it has only a few ships, 
especially those capable of operations abroad (limited capacity). Unfortunately, the 
limited capacity of those agencies is insufficient to cover the current the demand signal 
for their authorities and expertise, little lone to broadly cover the Navy. 
2. Indirect Approach 
a. Theater Security Cooperation 
The Navy’s gaps and deficiencies in authority and capability affect not 
only direct approach operations, but also TSC. The Navy’s skills and equipment do not 
translate to most partners’ needs. NECC, which has some relevant skills and capability, is 
too small to cover the breadth of the TSC program adequately. Since building partner 
capacity is the Navy’s most important task to support maritime security, it is important to 
have the missions, skill sets, and equipment germane to potential partners.  
As the only global Navy, the U.S. Navy inherited the international 
maritime system, which promotes trade, good order, and freedom of the seas. Protection 
of that system is beneficial for everyone, including the United States. Maritime security 
threats currently pose the greatest threat to the global maritime commons and are the 
leading concern to most maritime nations. Maritime law enforcement provides the best 
means to overcome those threats. For the Navy to be affective in MSO, act as a global 
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naval leader, and build partner naval capacity, embracing maritime law enforcement 
capabilities and authorities is vital. But, the Navy clearly has gaps and deficiencies in its 
authorities and capabilities, which in turn restricts its ability. In order for the Navy to take 
on greater law enforcement roles to help close those gaps, what is the cost (in terms of 
fiscal cost, traditional operations, and warfighting readiness) to close the those gaps, i.e., 
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V. CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF THE NAVY IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ROLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV identified numerous problems in the Navy’s capacity, capability, and 
authority for maritime security. This chapter assumes that Navy law enforcement roles 
can help overcome the gaps/shortfalls/deficiencies in maritime security identified in the 
last chapter. To reduce those problems through law enforcement roles ultimately requires 
dedicated resources (budget, personnel, training, equipment, and time). In a strained 
resource environment and with Navy’s remaining traditional warfare focus, 293  the 
required resources for maritime security only creates greater resource competition 
between maritime security and traditional naval warfare, regardless if maritime security is 
one of the six strategic imperatives of the Navy’s maritime strategy. Since any further 
commitment to maritime security will likely be contentious, it begs asking the 
fundamental question, is it ultimately worth it given the current state of the Navy? 
Accordingly, what are the concerns related to a larger Navy law enforcement focus in 
maritime security and are they warranted? This chapter will attempt to answer the latter 
questions.  
This chapter will first briefly look at the current debate over the Navy conducting 
maritime security in order to identify the major concerns with expanded maritime 
security roles. The main portion of the chapter focuses on analyzing the concerns (in 
terms of fiscal costs, operational focus, and warfighting readiness), in order to determine 
the merit of those concerns, as they relate to the Navy’s role in maritime law 
enforcement. Understanding the concerns over a greater maritime security role for the 
Navy and its effect on the Navy’s core warfighting missions, in terms of budget, 
operations, and mission readiness, is integral to arguing the value in expanding law 
enforcement roles for the Navy.  
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B.  DEBATE OVER COSTS 
When the Navy began to increase its role in maritime security missions, a debate 
formed over the effects of using the Navy to conduct law enforcement or constabulary 
missions. One side argues the Navy should not act in a constabulary capacity out of 
concerns that maritime security missions are: too costly compared to the threat, increases 
the mission obligations of an already overburdened organization, detracts too much from 
traditional operations requirements, and reduces warfighting readiness. The opposite side 
argues military operations and warfighting readiness do not suffer from maritime security 
missions.  
For those opposed to greater constabulary role, one of the concerns is that 
warfighting must be a priority. From a statutory perspective, the Navy is tasked to fight 
and win wars; anything else needs to be considered secondary, including maritime 
security.294 This is especially true in austere times.295 Some argue that traditional warfare 
and law enforcement skills are exclusive; therefore, they can only compete against each 
other in readiness and capability.296 As an article from the Washington University Law 
Quarterly states, “This change of focus lessens the fighting edge of the military and 
dampens the “warrior spirit.”“ 297  Some argue that the Navy can do maritime law 
enforcement but cannot be expected to be an expert. 298  One of the DoD’s main 
arguments against increasing support to law enforcement missions concerned the effect 
on operational readiness, leading to Title 10 USC § 376, which asserts, “Support… may 
not be provided to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter if the 
provision of such support will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United 
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States.”299 From a proportionality and fiscal cost perspective, it is argued that high-end 
cost and capabilities of traditional naval forces are too disproportionate to the low-end 
maritime security threats. As one article from U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings claims, 
“It is nothing more than high-seas criminal activity, better addressed by law enforcement 
agencies than warships. As a localized nuisance, it should not serve to shape maritime 
force structure or strategy.” 300  Using sophisticated and expensive warships is not 
sustainable for lesser tasks.301 Lastly, opponents argue that the Navy is not a desirable 
entity for the criminal nature of maritime security threats due the “political “baggage” 
associated with the U.S. Navy”302 as a tool of war, e.g., the difference between the “gray 
hull” and “white hull” perceptions. 
The other school of thought argues maritime security missions are either 
beneficial or help sustain Navy forces. It is also debated whether the nature of the 
maritime security threat environment has changed and that traditional missions are no 
longer the number one strategic priority.303 Therefore, it is acceptable to share or replace 
some traditional warfighting aspects of the Navy. Some contend that in the absence of 
major competitors, maritime security missions help readiness by helping to preserve force 
end strength and operational funding from typical peacetime cuts. 304 Others see that 
maritime security operations contribute to force readiness because these real-world 
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operations utilize some of the same equipment and skills, like surveillance, 
reconnaissance, seamanship, and targeting skills as they would in traditional missions.305 
Both sides of the debate offer sensible arguments, but in the end, the conclusions 
derived from the arguments are subjective and difficult to prove. What the debate does 
offer is a list of concerns that will help shape the costs and benefits analysis. Since the 
Navy’s strategic focus remains on the ability to maintain warfighting capacity and 
capability, this chapter’s cost/benefit arguments will concentrate on the concerns over 
law enforcements roles at the expense of the Navy traditional warfighting mission in 
terms of budget, operations and readiness.  
C. OPERATIONAL CONCERNS 
This section will cover several operational concerns from the Navy operating in a 
law enforcement capacity. The first concern is the Navy’s OPTEMPO is already too high, 
and an increased role in maritime security will further strain the Navy’s resources. This 
study argues that MSO does not necessarily increase the Navy’s OPTEMPO, and by 
further streamlining current operations with MSO can increase effectiveness without 
excessive strain for the Navy. However, MSO does potentially generate a larger burden 
to individual units engaged in a maritime security missions. Another concern covered is 
that foreign partners negatively perceive the Navy for use in maritime law enforcement. 
This section argues there is a perception problem, but its extent and cause are 
undetermined. The evidence about the Navy’s perception is mixed and inconclusive. The 
last operational concern is that expanding law enforcement authorities will create the 
potential for confusion between the Navy and other LEAs, chiefly the Coast Guard. It is 
also debated  that the Navy’s complementary force structure to the Coast Guard and 
existing process help mitigate confusion, and therefore, is not a large operational concern.  
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1. Concern: MSO Further Burdens the Navy’s High Operations Tempo 
(OPTEMPO) 
A major concern of maritime security operations is the chance they increase the 
Navy’s already extensive mission load. The largest capacity issue the Navy faces is a 
high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) compared to its resources. The Navy is only able to 
meet an average of 59 percent of the Combatant Commander’s requirements,306 while 
platforms and crews suffer from fatigue and maintenance issues. 307  Adding specific 
maritime security missions potentially increases ship requirements because it is a 
capacity intensive mission area. Increased mission requirements will increase platform 
and crew fatigue. The only two possible solutions to decrease fatigue are either to 
increase asset capacity or decrease deployment frequency—but how does maritime 
security affect stretched resources? 
a. MSO Does Not Necessarily Represent an Increase of in 
OPTEMPO 
Participating in maritime security operations does not necessarily 
represent an increase of deployments specifically for maritime security. The reason 
increasing the authorities and capabilities do not necessarily increase deployments is that 
the Navy can and currently does operate in a dual role of traditional and maritime 
security operations. In most cases, the Navy conducts maritime security in conjunction 
with regularly scheduled deployments and/or operations. A recent article released by the 
USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group (JCSCSG) Public Affairs highlights this dual 
role stating,  
JCSCSG will be joining USS George H.W. Bush Strike Group, already in 
the 5th Fleet AOR. An overlap of carrier deployments provides additional 
naval and air capabilities to conduct maritime security operations and 
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theater security cooperation engagements, as well as provide support to 
operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom.308 
If the Navy is not engaged in actual conflict, presence in order to prevent 
conflict becomes its strategic role. As stated in the U.S. naval strategy, preventing 
conflict is as important as winning war.309  Maritime security’s aim is to aid stability and 
security, which helps prevent war, therefore, it should be a priority mission that 
accompanies physical presence. Without conflict, there is an implicit “excess” capacity 
that allows the Navy to conduct other important missions, while still being available to 
support traditional warfighting requirements if the need arises. Excess capacity compared 
to traditional mission requirements is the reason the Navy forces are free to participate in 
maritime security missions, such as Combined Maritime Forces missions and TSC in 
Africa and the Middle East. National strategic priorities, along with Combat Commander 
requirements, will determine where the capacity goes, which determines where the Navy 
can provide maritime security overseas. Codified law enforcement roles can only help 
their maritime security portion of their dual role purpose without interfering traditional 
warfighting requirements 
b. Streamlining Operations Reduces the Need for Increased 
Underways/Deployments 
Just as the Navy conducts MSO in conjunction with traditional missions, 
combining underway training with MSO does not greatly affect underway time and 
frequency, while also offering improvement to homeland security. Overlaying fleet 
training areas with known maritime security threat areas is a way to streamline both 
training operations and homeland security. For example, moving the East Coast’s 
Jacksonville fleet training area to south of the Florida Keys allows ships and aircraft to 
train, to provide extra sensors, and if needed, and possible interdiction of illegal migrants 
or illicit trafficking. Other examples can include establishing a Hawaii training operating 
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area (OPAREA) adjacent to known fisheries in the Hawaiian EEZ, and moving the 
Southern California OPAREA to overlap the approaches to Mexico and Southern 
California to provide extra coverage for illegal migrants and illicit trafficking. Cases do 
exist where Navy ships, in the course of their training operations, have stumbled across 
illicit-traffickers in the Southern California OPAREA. 310 Shifting of OPAREAs will 
certainly increase operational costs to place the fleet a little further from normal fleet 
training areas, but there is the gained benefit of providing extra capability to address 
homeland maritime security threats if needed. The changing of OPAREAs is akin to 
streamlined operations that provide both regular operations with maritime security need, 
like to the Navy fishery patrols through Oceana, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, 
while ships are transiting across the Pacific.311 
c. MSO Increases Individual Unit Burden 
Direct law enforcement missions can be people intensive and time 
consuming to most combatants. A Navy ship “tied down” in performing a maritime 
security mission may not be available for other tasking, creating concern for Combatant 
Commanders. The reason a Navy ship may be unavailable for quick retasking is that an 
interdiction operation never ends with just a boarding. It can require thorough searches, 
lengthy evidence collection and information exploitation, detainee handling, and finally 
the chance for a lengthy trial.  
Searches of vessels can sometimes take days, if properly conducted. For 
instance, in 2000, Coast Guard and customs officers spent ten days to search and remove 
cocaine from Haitian cargo ships. 312 In another example in 2009, a British frigate’s 
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(HMS Iron Duke) crew “spent more than 24 hours painstakingly scouring the vessel for 
narcotics. The drugs were hidden under the ship’s regular stores, beneath a concrete floor 
and steel panels. Tonnes of stock had to be moved, the hard floor broken up with sledge 
hammers and metal panels unbolted before the stash was revealed.” 313  Typically, 
lengthier searches are conducted in a port to free the law enforcement asset for follow-on 
operations,314 but the process of potentially transporting suspects, witnesses, evidence, 
and escorting/towing a suspect vessel over long distances can increase the time a Navy 
vessel is engaged in a single maritime security mission.315 Evidence collection and case 
package building can only add additional time in to the process.  
Evidence does suggest that interdiction or related operations can 
potentially be lengthy and can prevent a ship from conducting other immediate tasks. 
Despite the potentially lengthy missions, if retasking was necessary for a higher propriety 
mission, it is assumed the Navy platform would end its current engagement as quickly as 
possible. Ultimately, the choice will fall on the operational commander to make the 
decision to continue engaging, or to disengage a suspected vessel. If they choose to 
disengage, it may create some delay for a ship to respond to other emergent tasking, but 
that delay can be counted in hours versus days. The point is that maritime security 
interdictions and related operations do not significantly delay or reduce Navy warship’s 
ability to conduct traditional missions 
2. Concern: There is a Negative Perception of the Navy’s Involvement in 
MSO 
Perception of the Navy’s presence and action is important for obtaining maritime 
security. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most important aspects of 
achieving maritime security is for the Navy to be relevant to the needs of partner nations. 
As Edward Smith, a senior defense analyst, states, “the keywords in shaping a local 
                                                 
313 Daily Mail, “Royal Navy Seizes Record Cocaine Haul Worth £240m - Then Sinks Drug Boat,” 
September 28, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1216581/Royal-Navy-seizes-record-cocaine-
haul-worth-240m--sinks-drug-boat.html#ixzz1p2nl2ovC. 
314 Markowitz, “Ships Yield Cocaine Haul Hidden Drugs Worth $23 million.” 
315 Warner, “Pieces of Eight,” 71. 
103 
 
security calculus are actions and perceptions.” 316 Having the authorities to enforce law 
enforcement related incidents can also prove to have important strategic effects through 
perception. The rescue of the Iranian-flagged fishing vessel Al Molai provides a case in 
point because it created the opportunity to provide legitimacy for Navy operations in the 
region, undercutting the rhetoric of Iran who threatened the U.S. presence and even 
gaining praise from the Iranian government.317 A law enforcement approach offers the 
chance for more access, as witnessed by the bilateral agreements with many Caribbean 
and Central American governments.  
a. Ascertaining the Navy’s Ability to Access to Partner Nations 
Through Law Enforcement Means is Problematic  
The perception of military forces may play a critical role in preventing the 
Navy’s “gray hull” ships to gain law enforcement access to partner nations. Since law 
enforcement operations are a manifestation of a nation’s sovereignty,318 the perception of 
using a foreign military to engage in law enforcement could be perceived as an 
unacceptable breach of that sovereignty.319 For instance, the plan to use the U.S. Navy to 
conduct counter-piracy patrols to confront a spike in piracy around the Strait of Malacca 
in the early 2000s provoked criticism from Malaysia and Indonesia due to the perception 
it would erode their sovereignty.320 However, Malaysia and Indonesia were willing to 
work with the Japanese and U.S. Coast Guards.321 Perception concerns may also inhibit 
expanding bilateral/multilateral agreements to incorporate the Navy. 322  The 
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preponderance of JIATF-S’s bilateral agreements with Latin America do not allow the 
Navy to conduct law enforcement independently of the Coast Guard or host nation ship-
riders to enforce laws because of the nonmilitary nature of counter-illicit trafficking 
operations. 323 In contrast to the Navy, the overseas perception of the Coast Guard’s 
“sovereignty expertise” in respecting the laws and sovereignty of partner nations is the 
reason the Coast Guard has access (including through bilateral/multilateral agreements) 
to many partners abroad. 324  Since these agreements are critical to expanding the 
jurisdictional reach of the United States, partner nations’ rejection of the Navy’s law 
enforcement roles could critically reduce the effectiveness of the Navy’s expanded law 
enforcement authorities abroad.  
While there does seem to be a perception issue with the Navy, its extent 
and exact nature are difficult to understand. It solicits the question: Is it the military 
nature of the Navy that prevents access, or is it the Navy has not proven its “sovereignty 
expertise,” like the Coast Guard, since it has historically not conducted maritime law 
enforcement in order to build expertise and partner nation trust? Navy ships that employ 
LEDETs personify the question. Many of the partnership programs, including the 
bilateral agreements, do allow the use of Navy equipment for law enforcement purposes, 
as witnessed in the Southern Command’s counter-illicit-trafficking operations. 
Outwardly, a pure Navy interdiction and a Navy-LEDET interdiction are almost 
identical. The only difference is four to six Coast Guardsmen. Even the tactical control 
shift of the Navy vessel to the Coast Guard (indicated by hoisting the Coast Guard flag 
from the yardarm) is primarily symbolic, since there is no statutory requirement for 
transfer. An interdicted suspect only sees a Navy helicopter, a “gray hulled” Navy vessel, 
and personnel with nearly identical uniforms. To an outside observer, it looks almost 
purely like a military operation. Yet, these operations are acceptable for many partner  
 
                                                 
323 For a list of current counterdrug bilateral agreements, see U.S. Coast Guard OPLAW Fast Action 
Reference Materials, series (2009) (For Official Use Only manual); National Research Council, Maritime 
Security Partnerships, 35–37. 
324 Ibid., 8. 
105 
 
nations. This makes it hard to argue the “gray hull” perception problem. The real 
difference comes from the expertise and authorities the LEDET carries—lending 
credence that it is more an expertise issue.  
In addition, there are plenty of instances where the Navy can obtain access 
in the international realm, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, anti-piracy 
operations, and U.N. resolutions. Also, the fact that the majority of the world’s navies are 
dual-natured navies (traditional and constabulary) lends credence to the idea that a 
military perception problem is not overly pervasive on the maritime domain. On the other 
hand, there is a growing advocacy among potential partner nations for establishing coast 
guards, which shows a drive to more civil maritime law enforcement oriented governance 
rather than utilizing standard military forces.325 The worldwide naval capacity gap on the 
maritime domain very well could overshadow perception issues, as long as the Navy 
shows it is both authorized and capable of enforcing constabulary roles. 
Preliminarily, a perception problem does appear to have some merit, but 
the degree and cause of the perception problem is difficult to ascertain. The mixed 
evidence does not definitively support if an issue is related to military or an expertise 
perception. No known research or studies exist to determine if the Navy is able to access 
partner countries acting in an independent law enforcement capacity. This represents a 
possible research area. 
3. Concern: Jurisdictional Overlap Can Cause Confusion Among 
Agencies with Similar Missions 
If the Navy has law enforcement authorities, this section will look at the potential 
for confusion arising from Coast Guard and Navy jurisdictional overlaps for maritime 
security missions. Expanding legal authorities will create greater mission overlap 
between the Coast Guard and the Navy. More mission overlap does create the potential 
for further confusion over jurisdictional issues in addressing maritime security threats. 
For instance, a Department of Justice OIG report found jurisdictional overlap confusion 
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in maritime and port security created the potential for incidents between the Coast Guard 
and FBI. 326  The OIG report concluded that greater cooperation and communication 
between the FBI and Coast Guard could mitigate those issues. 327  Better 
coordination/integration with the Coast Guard, along with greater utilization of the 
MOTR process, can help prevent jurisdictional issues and provide the proper response in 
missions. One of the easy processes that can reduce that potential is use the of LEA 
agents, such as a Coast Guard LEDET, who has direct jurisdiction over most threats.  
Jurisdictional overlap is not likely to cause a considerable problem between the 
Coast Guard and Navy. This is because of the limited asset capacity and complimentary 
force structure of both services. The Navy’s offshore capability offers a complementary 
role to Coast Guard forces, especially in balancing their limited deepwater capability and 
capacity. The Navy’s offshore operations and training should help preserve over-lapping 
jurisdictional issues, since a majority of Coast Guard are closely tied closer to the shore. 
The complimentary forces can create a more balanced approach to applying maritime 
security to the homeland. In addition, processes already exist that can help avoid 
jurisdictional confusion between the Coast Guard and the Navy.  
In addition, current coordination processes, such as MOTR or the operational 
control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) transfer procedure used with LEDETs, 
aid in the prevention of jurisdictional overlap. The OPCON and TACON transfer process 
places the Navy unit under the command of a LEA during maritime interdictions. It 
increases coordination and demarcation of operational responsibilities because it places a 
civil law enforcement agency clearly in charge of an emergent mission, so they can 
delineate jurisdictional responsibilities. This process can happen regardless of having 
embarked LE agents or not. In addition to reducing jurisdictional confusion, it increases 
civil legitimacy and control of military involved in LE missions, and it fosters deeper 
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coordination between the Navy and LEAs. 328 The process should also be considered for 
use with the Coast Guard for overseas operations because of the Coast Guard’s open 
access with other nations and maritime organizations, and operational expertise in 
maritime security and civil maritime operations. Since the Navy and Coast Guard have 
over three decades of control transfer experience from law enforcement missions, it will 
be unproblematic to expand the process. 
D. READINESS  
The main argument against the Navy conducting maritime security missions is the 
detraction from the skills and time needed to train for traditional warfare missions. This 
section will argue the Navy has the capacity to conduct training for maritime security 
missions and traditional missions because the frequency of most direct enforcement 
missions is relatively low. In addition, the Navy’s multi-mission capability, along with 
MSO’s partial similarity to traditional missions, allows the Navy to conduct MSO 
without much effect on its warfighting capability. Lastly, the changing nature of the 
threat into more sophisticated and dangerous threats increases the relevancy of more 
traditional warfare methods to confront them. 
1. Concern: MSO Does Not Allow Time for Traditional Warfare 
Training 
The capacity to train for traditional warfare is possible while conducting maritime 
security missions. Although maritime security threats are abundant, actual enforcement 
missions do not typically occur for law enforcement platforms on a daily basis. For 
instance, on an average six-month counter-drug deployment, a Navy ship may only 
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interdict three or four illicit-trafficking vessels.329 That equates to less than one actual 
counter-drug interdiction a month. Anti-piracy operations, which potentially have higher 
operations tempo for interdictions, are still relatively infrequent. For example, the USS 
Bainbridge’s seven-month deployment in 2011 conducted 27 anti-piracy missions.330 
This represents a high frequency deployment. In contrast, the USS Laboon only 
conducted three anti-piracy missions during a six-month deployment in 2010.331 Even at 
the higher end of interdiction frequency, anti-piracy operations accounted for only four 
missions a month. The point is to show the frequency of actual maritime security 
interdictions is small compared to relative underway time, allowing the time to train for 
traditional mission areas as well. It is important to recognize that ships do conduct other 
activities during deployments, which can include theater security cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military-to-military interaction and bilateral 
and multinational training.332 The times between actual events and other activities allows 
time for training on traditional mission sets. The evidence suggests maritime security 
operations do not seriously detract from traditional warfare training time. 
a. MSO Can Stress an Individual Ship’s Resources Potentially 
Reducing Readiness 
The detention of suspects can also create a burden to Navy ships because 
they are not meant to handle prisoners. The Optimal Manning Initiative reduced ships’ 
crew sizes, leaving little margin between necessary routine duties and the addition of 
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extra duties, such as guard duty. 333  Holding detainees on board ship requires 
crewmembers to be removed from normal ship’s watch rotation to maintain guard over 
suspects, extra logistics, and dedicated space to hold them.334  
Depending on the amount of detainees, the burden of detainees can create 
extra strain on a ship’s regular operations. In some cases, it can take time to find the 
proper jurisdictional venue to prosecute offenders, extending the time for holding 
detainees aboard ship. For example, by the end of January 2012, 71 pirates are still being 
held aboard anti-piracy warships waiting to transfer the pirates to a court, but no country 
is willing to take jurisdiction for prosecution. 335  Piracy is as an extreme situation, 
because most other maritime security threats, with the exception of some migrant cases, 
have a little clearer jurisdiction of responsible nations in order to transfer suspects 
quickly. If detention will be lengthy, the transfer of detainees to ships that can absorb the 
burden, like amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, can alleviate the load from other 
combatant ships.  
Cases going through the judicial process can take a great deal of time. For 
the Navy (and even the Coast Guard), ship’s personnel acting as court witnesses may be 
lost to court proceedings for periods at a time, creating greater hardships for the crew.336 
Good procedures/doctrine can reduce the impact of losing a critical/large number of 
crewmembers to court proceedings, such as designating noncritical crewmembers to 
function as the witnesses. 
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Law enforcement missions can also present extra burdens to individual 
warships, but there are no existing studies or assessments to determine if these extra 
burdens truly degrade a warship’s warfighting capability. As such, it cannot be argued 
that direct enforcement operations degrade warships’ warfighting capabilities/readiness. 
However, it is important to recognize the potential effects these operations have on 
individual crews and ships. 
2. Concern: Traditional Warfare and Maritime Security Skills are 
Exclusive  
Another concern for the employment of Navy forces against maritime security 
threats is the fear that maritime security skill sets will erode warfighting skills. This 
section argues there are some similarities in the equipment, sensors, and tactics used for 
MSO and traditional warfare. In addition, the changing nature of the maritime security 
threat is starting to draw the threats closer to hybrid or traditional threats. Lastly, if the 
most prominent actual threat is maritime security related, then improvement of those 
skills is currently necessary to help provide security to the global commons. 
a. MSO Offers Some Similarity and Benefit to Traditional Missions  
Despite arguments that MSO does not provide real-world training for 
traditional warfare missions, evidence suggests MSO does provide some benefit for real-
world traditional warfare experience. Counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and 
Eastern Pacific have long been used as a proving ground to test and evaluate current and 
new technologies and platforms.337  This is understandable, since many of the sensors, 
communications systems, networked systems and search skills used for the real-world 
counter-drug operations are employable for traditional combat needs.338 These counter-
drug missions must have enough real-world applications to satisfy the DoD for testing 
equipment and platforms.  
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Clearly, drug-operations and other MSO cannot provide real-world testing 
against high-end threats, like ballistic missiles or well-armed warships. Training systems 
and larger fleet exercises are available to provide that coverage. As criminal and terrorist 
organizations get increased access to proliferated weapons that gap between high-end and 
low-end may begin to diminish. The Hezbollah attack on an Israeli frigate with an anti-
ship missile in 2006 helps highlight this.339 Drug-cartels now employ fully submersible 
submarines in their efforts to evade law enforcement.340 This poses a particular problem 
for the Coast Guard, which does not have anti-submarine capability. Therefore, the threat 
represents one where only the Navy has the capability to engage the threat at sea. The use 
of fully submersible submarines creates the opportunity for the Navy to employ its anti-
submarine warfare skills against real-world threats. 
b. The Navy is Multi-Mission Capable 
One of the Navy’s claims is that it is a multi-mission service that is able to 
provide maritime security and humanitarian assistance while remaining combat 
effective.341 These multi-mission capabilities of the Navy allow it the flexibility to switch 
quickly between operations short of war and war. For instance, a deployed aircraft carrier 
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day provide humanitarian aid to Japan. 342  Multiple mission platforms 343  are also 
indicative of the Navy’s determination to use its platforms to address a large array of 
maritime threats. Maritime security is an acknowledged capability of most of the Navy’s 
Battle Force Ships.344 Expanding law enforcement authority and capability transforms 
most Navy platforms into more capable platforms that can address a greater spectrum of 
maritime threats. The LEDET program quintessentially represents the combination of LE 
authority and capabilities onto a traditional multi-mission Navy platform with proven 
success.  
c. Consistent Employment Improves Skills Proficiency for Most 
Likely Operations 
In the absence of traditional naval war and/or a true peer enemy, like the 
Soviet Navy, MSO dominates the Navy’s daily operations. If Navy personnel and 
platforms are likely be engaged in MSO, then it seems appropriate to dedicate training 
and building operational expertise in order to become more effective at those operations. 
In other words, there needs to be a proper balance between the most likely threat and the 
most dangerous one.  
Logically, the more a Navy asset performs a mission, the better it will 
become at that mission. The same is true for maritime security. Navy assets conducting 
continuous homeland and overseas MSO offer the opportunity for building and sustaining 
operational experience. 345  Performing homeland MSO helps prepare units for 
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deployment, while overseas experience ensure units are highly trained for homeland 
operations. To determine the benefits of combining normal training operations with MSO 
is challenging. Since the Navy does not conduct homeland MSO on a regular basis or in a 
law enforcement capacity, no evidence exists to formulate a conclusion. 
Depending on how authorities are expanded will determine the level of 
expertise and authorities the Navy will have. The regulatory mission of the Coast Guard 
allows them to have greater expertise in private/commercial maritime platforms and 
operations. This expertise and regulatory authority leads to many of the Coast Guard’s 
law enforcement missions. For instance, many of criminal activities are discovered 
through “compliance examinations,” whether by accident, or if there was reasonable 
suspicion for illegal activities. 346 The amount of training and operational experience 
needed for regulatory inspections makes it a prohibitive duty for Navy personnel. The 
Navy’s traditional core focus does cap its dedication to law enforcement training and 
maritime security operations, so the Navy cannot gain the same expertise and 
understanding of private/commercial vessels and civil maritime operations to the same 
degree as the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s daily concentration on civil maritime 
operations affords them the myopic focus to build the expertise for regulatory functions. 
An option for the Navy operating near the homeland is the ability to draw 
from existing law enforcement agencies, besides the Coast Guard, to provide expertise 
and legal authorities. For example, a Navy  about to conduct training operations near a 
fisheries location within the EEZ can bring aboard a National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Fisheries Service ship-rider. This is translatable to any other 
LEA, like the DEA, CBP, and FBI for other maritime security threats. These services will 
provide expertise in their field, but they do not have the multi-discipline nature and 
tactical expertise of the Coast Guard.  
                                                 
346 “Compliance examinations are most closely associated with enforcement of laws and regulations 
pertaining to recreational boating safety, fisheries management, conservation, marine pollution, and 
customs. The Coast Guard refers to this activity as maritime law enforcement (MLE), enforcement of laws 
and treaties (ELY), and sometimes inspections.” National Research Council, Fishing Vessel Safety: 
Blueprint for a National Program (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1991), 213–214. 
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E. FISCAL COSTS 
The largest problem for the Navy in maritime security is having the adequate 
funding to provide for both maritime security and traditional missions (e.g., a capacity 
issue). Funding ideally allows the Navy to apply more money, personnel, and platforms 
to maritime problems. With pending budget constraints and competition for resources, it 
can be assumed that an increase of dedicated funding and resources is not likely for 
maritime security, unless MSO can be efficiently and economically combined with 
traditional missions and its associated funding.347  
There are two main concerns related to fiscal cost and the increasing of law 
enforcement powers for the Navy: first, expanding the Navy’s role in maritime law 
enforcement will require extra funding and increase the operating budget. Second, the 
cost of using high-end warships is too disproportional for low-end threats. For the former, 
expanding law enforcement roles will require an increase in funding, to support LE roles, 
unless it assumes a greater share of the Navy’s current budget. However, the cost of 
direct enforcement operations is relatively small compared to the Navy normal operating 
budget. In response to the second concern, Navy warship operating costs are considerably 
higher for MSO compared to the Coast Guard.  
1. Concern: Law Enforcement in MSO is Likely to Increase in 
Budgetary Costs 
Findings do indicate that there are increases in the budgetary costs for expanding 
the Navy’s maritime security mission. While these costs are increased, there is no 
determination on the increase because it highly depends on how LE authorities and 
capabilities are expanded. Preliminary evidence suggests that actual direct MSO costs are 
relatively small, especially when in conjunction with traditional operations. 
                                                 
347 Consequently, resources will be considered zero sum meaning resources/funding increase to one 
mission area will subtract funding from another area (e.g., maritime security funding will subtract from 
traditional mission funding). 
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a. MSO Does Increase Budgetary Costs 
To provide the Navy with law enforcement authorities and capabilities 
will require funding to build and support training, personnel, equipment, and operational 
funding for law enforcement missions. The total costs are highly dependent on the 
options used for expanding law enforcement roles. An example of training costs to send a 
junior officer or petty officer through the Coast Guard’s Maritime Law Enforcement 
School would cost the Navy $5,661 in FY 2012.348 The cost can be somewhat offset by 
the fact that junior officer would not have to attend the Navy’s VBSS Boarding Officer 
course of instruction. However, the Coast Guard does not have the capacity to train 
potentially hundreds of Navy candidates; 349  therefore, funding would be required to 
increase the capacity law enforcement. For an example of operations cost, the DoD cost 
estimate for dedicated anti-piracy operations was $64 million in FY 2009,350 and most of 
that cost was incurred by the Navy. If operations were to include fisheries enforcement, 
customs, and immigration enforcement, the direct costs would certainly increase. The 
purpose is to show that there are costs associated with adding law enforcement roles for 
the Navy. 
In addition, much of the Navy’s overseas maritime security missions are 
funded currently by an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget supplemental.351 
The impending termination of OCO funding is likely to cause a reduction in the Navy’s 
maritime security operations abroad, if not funded from other sources. If maritime 
security operations are going to be maintained at their current levels, it will require a 
larger share of the Navy’s regular operating budget.  
                                                 
348 Tim Casares, email message to author, January, 18, 2012.  
349 Lou Orsini in discussion with author, Washington, DC, December 6, 2011.  
350 GAO, Maritime Security, 9. 
351 DoD, FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request: Exhibit OP‐05 Overseas 
Contingency Operations, 154. 
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b. Direct Maritime Security Mission Costs are Relatively Small 
Increased costs are inevitable for maritime security operations, regardless 
of the options employed. An important fiscal cost are those associated for direct 
enforcement operations, such as detainment and providing medicine/meals for detainees, 
vessel towing/escort, evidence/prisoner transportation, fuel, etc.352  
Overall, these costs are relatively small. For example, the DoD’s $64 
million for dedicated anti-piracy operations would, if the Navy incurred the majority of 
the costs, represent roughly 0.2 percent of the Navy’s FY 2009 regular operating 
budget.353 Piracy operations denote one of the Navy’s largest dedicated MSO. Even for 
year round operations, with a daily average of four dedicated Navy warships and other 
supporting elements, the total cost represents only a small portion of the Navy’s operating 
budget. The Coast Guard’s MSO support for the Navy in the Middle East (including six 
cutters and their crews, several port security units, LEDETs, and Maritime Security and 
Safety Teams) only cost $241 million (0.56 percent of the entire Navy’s FY 2010 O&M 
budget) for FY 2010. 354  Almost all of the funding comes from OCO supplemental 
funds.355 Initial evidence shows that the direct fiscal costs are related with MSO. Further 
tracking and recording of fiscal costs associated with MSO can help provide the data and 
metrics needed for later research into the actual fiscal costs linked to the Navy’s MSO. 
This will help policymakers determine the real expenses involved with maritime security 
operations. 
2. Concern: Navy High-End Warships are Too Expensive for MSO 
Large surface combatants can handle most maritime security threats, but they 
represent a disproportionate response to most maritime security threats. Most Navy 
surface combatants are designed for high-end threats and require a much higher operating 
                                                 
352 Warner, “Pieces of Eight,” 39. 
353 FY09 Highlights, 7–3.http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/Highlights_book.pdf  
354 Ibid., A-5. 
355 DoD, FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request: Exhibit OP‐05 Overseas 
Contingency Operations, 154. 
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cost to confront a low-end threat compared to small combatants, like frigates or 
cutters.356 Table 1 shows the daily operating costs of larger Navy combatants can cost 
nearly two to eight times that of smaller combatants. Combatant commanders can address 
maritime security threats with the current force structure, and currently do this. This 
could represent a trade-off for most combatant commanders to employ the Navy in a dual 
role. If combatant commanders are unwilling to accept the risk of reducing high-end 
capability, then they need to be willing to accept the disproportionate higher costs of 
applying high-end capabilities to low-end missions. 
If the cost  to employ high-end warships remains unsustainable, while the need for 
maritime security remains strong, other alternatives exist to provide the Navy with a 
balanced “High-Low” force, using the  words of former Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Zumwalt’s vision for a balanced fleet,357 A study from the Naval Postgraduate 
School, led by naval strategist Wayne Hughes, proposes the Navy can have a balanced  
fleet that not only increases the Navy’s capacity but is also more capable in traditional 
warfare and maritime security. In addition and most importantly, it can be achieved 
utilizing the Navy’s current budget.358 
Any increase in operations without extra funding will not be a popular proposition 
for most policymakers. Theoretically, if the Navy organizationally increases the 
importance of maritime security, then allotting a greater percentage of the total budget is 
feasible. This is why determining actual budgetary costs are an important component in 
persuading the government on the employment of the Navy in maritime security 
operations. This is beyond the scope of this paper but to explore the aggregate cost of 
MSO, as compared to traditional missions, presents an important avenue for further 
research. 
 
                                                 
356 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 
Small Combatant Programs (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 5, 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/104xx/doc10460/07-17-smallcombatants.pdf.  
357 Jonathan E. Czarnecki, “Confronting All Enemies: The U.S. Navy, 1962-1980,” in In Peace and 
War Interpretations of American Naval History, eds Kenneth J. Hagan and Michael T. McMaster 
(Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2008), 275.  
358 Hughes, et al., A New Navy Fighting Machine (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
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Table 1.   Average Daily Operating Costs for U.S. Naval Vessels Commonly 
Involved in Maritime Security Operations359 
  
Ship Type Average Life-Cycle Cost Per 
Day (thousands of dollars) 
Average Operating Cost Per Day 
without Platform Acquisition 
Costs 
Destroyer (DDG-51) $240 $122 
Cruiser (CG-47) $315 $157 
Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS-1) $117-$128* $38-$53* 
Frigate (FFG-7) $137 $77 
National Security 
Cutter (NSC) $73 $20 
Offshore patrol Cutter 
(OPC)** $39.5 $10 
* Costs depended on the LCS variant and does not include for the costs of the warfare modules 
** Offshore Patrol Cutter cost is estimated since none are operational 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite the Navy’s recognition that it needs to balance traditional warfare and 
irregular challenges, the Navy’s remaining traditional warfare focus creates competition 
between maritime security requirements and traditional warfare resources. This 
competition, exacerbated by austere budgets and growing costs of security, has sparked a 
debate about the importance and costs of maritime security for the Navy. The opponents 
of increased maritime security roles are concerned that the costs (fiscal, operational 
focus, and warfighting readiness) on the Navy’s mandatory warfighting mission too 
prohibitive. This chapter attempted to evaluate the concerns because it helps determine if 
the costs and benefits for law enforcement oriented MSO is worth it. 
                                                 
359 The table is created by the author, but the information is derived from Douglas Elemdorf, 
“Operations & Support Costs for Four Types of Navy Ships,” (Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Letter 
to Sen. Jeff Sessions, April 28 2010), 7; CBO, Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 




The main operational concern is that MSO further increases the Navy’s already 
substantial workload. Analysis of the concerns shows that the main burden on the Navy is 
a general capacity issue, not necessarily caused by maritime security resource 
requirements. This is because many maritime security missions are conducted in 
conjunction with normal deployments. The absence of traditional war allows Navy assets 
to perform maritime security in order to benefit security of the maritime global commons, 
while still maintaining a traditional presence.  
Streamlining training with homeland security missions, the Navy can improve 
homeland maritime security if applied smartly (e.g., enhanced cooperation and 
coordination with maritime LEAs). It provides extra maritime LE capacity and 
improves/sustains MSO skills while still maintaining a roughly normal 
operations/training tempo. However, an increase in dedicated MSO patrols and 
deployments will increase the burden on Navy platforms without increasing capacity or 
reducing regular deployments. The ultimate responsibility lies with Combatant 
Commanders to determine the priorities and objectives for the employment of forces to 
determine the overall capacity needed to meet those objectives.  
The perception concern has some merit, but the extent and cause are 
undetermined. The extent is undetermined because there are instances where countries 
allowed the Navy access and rejected access for law enforcement roles, leading to the 
conclusion that it is different for individual nations. It becomes important to determine if 
the perceptions of the Navy as a military service will overshadow its capability to 
conduct maritime LE. Evidence does not exclusively support one way or the other. 
Further study into this area is important to understand what the potential limitations are 
for the Navy to participate with other nations in a law enforcement capacity. 
2. Readiness  
Maritime LE does not represent a large degradation to the Navy’s traditional 
warfighting readiness. The multi-mission nature of Navy assets allows it to adapt quickly 
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between traditional and maritime security missions without much effect on its 
warfighting readiness. Even some of the systems and skills used for traditional warfare 
are applicable to MSO, further reducing the degradation. The frequency of interdictions 
will dictate the time available for traditional warfare training. In most cases, the 
frequency of MSO interdictions is relatively small compared to underway/deployment 
time allowing the Navy the time to still train for traditional warfare. If the frequency of 
interdictions significantly increases, then it will start to degrade traditional warfare 
training and readiness. 
3. Fiscal Costs 
To provide the Navy law enforcement powers will require an increase in 
dedicated funding to provide the infrastructure and support needed to support the 
mission. How those costs are distributed and to what to amount is highly dependent on 
how law enforcement powers are provided, whether sourced organically from the outside 
the organization, or both. Once those LE powers are in place, there is an expected 
increase in fiscal costs related to direct enforcement missions, such as those seen from 
anti-piracy operations. Preliminarily, many of those direct costs seem relatively small and 
consume only a minimal amount of the Navy’s operating budget. With shrinking budgets 
and a reduction in OCO funding, the Navy will need to fund those costs at the expense of 
traditional warfare funding. 
The Navy’s high-end warships are capable of addressing maritime security 
threats, but high-end warships are not economical means to confront maritime security 
threats. Clearly, there are increased costs in using high-end warships to address maritime 
security threats, as compared to utilizing Coast Guard platforms. However, a benefit for 
combatant commanders is that high-end warships retain the capability to address the full 
spectrum of high-end to low-end maritime threats.  
4. General Conclusion 
The overall significance of the concerns for increased Navy law enforcement is 
not easy to determine. The first and principal reason is that the Navy has not determined 
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what capacity it has for maritime security missions. The second reason is there are still 
large gaps in the research to help provide better data and understanding to the concerns. 
For now, until this topic is further researched, the concerns are not overly convincing to 
oppose expanding the Navy’s law enforcement role to overcoming the gaps in maritime 
security.  
Maritime security is a strategic imperative for the Navy. In reality, the Navy 
already conducts MSO on a daily basis in order to manage global security concerns. As 
such, operational necessities do not afford the Navy the luxury to reject maritime security 
from its multi-mission capabilities. The employment and workload of the force is still a 
strategic decision for the U.S. government and Navy leadership, but it does allow them to 
deploy a force that is armed with the legal authorities and subsequent capabilities able to 
operate in an uncertain security environment, where the maritime threat can be criminal, 
traditional, or hybrid in nature. Employing forces in a smart manner allows the Navy to 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE NAVY IS NOT PROPERLY ORGANIZED AND EMPLOYED FOR 
MARITIME SECURITY 
This thesis asks the question: Are our maritime security organizations, including 
the Navy, the Coast Guard and other organizations, properly organized and employed to 
ensure our nation’s maritime security?  This broad question focuses particularly on the 
Navy and the effect of law enforcement roles on the Navy in maritime security 
operations. The answer is, no, the Navy is neither properly organized nor employed to 
meet our nation’s maritime security needs; our nation’s security is at risk because of the 
nature of the maritime threat and because of gaps and seams in our laws and policies 
(authority), doctrine (capability), and organization (capability and capacity). As 
established in Chapter IV, the Navy needs all three—authorities, capabilities, and 
capacity— to effectively conduct maritime security. 
1. The Navy’s Lack of Law Enforcement Roles Degrades Maritime 
Security 
Laws and policies are important for an organization in establishing the types of 
capabilities needed and their implementation. Legal and policy restrictions prevent the 
Navy from direct involvement against many of the maritime security threats. This 
binding effect plainly reduces the efficiency of national and international maritime 
security. The current laws and policies are disconnecting the Navy’s missions from the 
law enforcing powers needed in order to confront the criminal nature of maritime security 
threats. While some threats, such as terrorism or hybrid threats, can require military 
capabilities and equipment, they still require law enforcement powers and laws to best 
address the threats. The change, over time of technology and sensitivity to the 
employment of force, has put the traditional system under strain in response to irregular 
challenges, compared to the past. The cliché, “Hang them [the threat offender] from the 
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yardarm” 360  is no longer appropriate for human rights purposes today; therefore, 
firepower is no longer the only tool, and certainly not the most pertinent, in maritime 
security. Arrest and prosecution becomes the most desirable means to remove the threat 
from the maritime domain.  
Maritime security threats have culminated to the point where the Navy 
institutionalized a maritime security mission into the Navy’s strategy and daily 
operations, but the laws and policies have not kept pace. In turn, they are preventing the 
Navy from receiving or institutionalizing law enforcement powers and capabilities that 
will make the Navy better at MSO and improve maritime security. Without the legal 
institutions forcing the change, the Navy is not expected to build the appropriate LE 
proficiency needed in these areas. However, the prevalence of maritime security threats 
and growing maritime security needs keep exempting the Navy from their general 
restriction in maritime law enforcement missions. When polices and laws are 
contradictory to the nature of the mission, it reduces MSO effectiveness. 
Chapter IV clearly showed there are gaps in the Navy’s skills and doctrine to 
obtain desirable outcomes, such as prosecution to improve the potency of MSO. Fine law 
enforcement skills, such as minimal use of force in order to reduce disruption to society, 
knowing how to conduct effective and legal searches, the knowledge to piece together 
case packages, and knowing the difference between evidence and intelligence, become 
incredibly important in maritime interception operations. The criminal nature of these 
threats and their extensive use of the civil maritime systems require a key knowledge of 
the law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures that make maritime LE agencies 
effective against standard commercial traffic. Without these skills, the Navy is 
unprepared and only partially effective in MSO.  
The current division of labor and restriction in law enforcement creates a 
numerical shortfall in the vessels needed to protect the maritime domain. While the Navy 
                                                 
360 Execution by hanging at the yardarm, which is part of a spar on a mast from which sails are set on 
old sailing vessels, was a traditional naval punishment at sea until the late 1800s. Washington Examiner, 




does use its ships to provide maritime security overseas, the division of labor exacerbates 
the capacity shortfall in the homeland. The Coast Guard, despite its tremendous 
contribution to the safety and security of American waters, is too overburdened and 
underequipped to meet the challenges of maritime security within the EEZ. As maritime 
traffic continues to increase and budgets decrease, it only seems logical to apply the Navy 
to provide coverage for the homeland where and when it can. As witnessed in the 
scenario in Chapter I, using the Navy’s presence and with the right capabilities can 
positively affect homeland maritime security.  
The interagency process, with its proven success in the cases of the LEDETs and 
other shiprider programs, has a major capacity shortfall. There are simply not enough 
LEDETs or other law enforcement agencies to leverage law enforcement powers and 
expertise for all the Navy platforms that may be involved in MSO. This shortfall requires 
action by the government and/or the Navy to find a way to reduce the shortfall, whether it 
is the granting LE powers and training for the Navy, or expanding the other organizations 
to provide LE coverage for the Navy.  
The testimony made by Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, who leads the Navy 
Irregular Warfare Office, provides a good summary of the problem with the Navy’s 
limited authorities and the current interagency process: 
Mr. THORNBERRY. …Where I would add, that evolution and maturation 
of doctrine is really critical and not just within the services, but within the 
country as a whole. Enormous challenges. More than the technical, I think, 
the law, and the policies, and doctrine and so forth.  
Admiral, let me just follow up…would you just make a brief overview 
about the relationship between you all and the Coast Guard when it comes 
to irregular warfare? Seems to me they have some law enforcement 
authorities that complement, hopefully, what you all do. Can you just 
comment on that briefly? 
Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir, I would be glad to…What we find with the 
Coast Guard, quite simply, is this. While the Navy maybe has capacity out 
to here [a hand gesture with hands positioned apart] in the number of 
ships, and sailors, and planes and the things we have to go out and do our 
mission, our authorities are fairly narrow because we are Title 10. On the 
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other hand, the Coast Guard has got a culture and has got capability and 
has a way of doing these things, and they have got a lot of entryway with 
the Departments of Interior in a number of nations that really hit the home 
of what the preventive actions that have to happen. Unfortunately, the 
Coast Guard only has capacity out to here [a hand gesture with hands 
positioned closer together], so it is trying to marry those two up [that is the 
issue]… 361 
Maritime Security is the most important consideration for the majority of the 
world’s navies. If the U.S. Navy wants to be recognized as a significant partner by these 
navies, it must participate in maritime security activities. Law enforcement provides the 
best means to address threats to maritime domain. Therefore, the U.S. Navy needs to be 
adept at law enforcement to participate effectively in maritime security activities with 
partner navies. Currently, the Navy does not translate well for the needs of other states in 
building their capacity. It reduces U.S. leadership, influence, and accessibility to partner 
nations. 
The conclusions do not say the Navy is not a valuable member in providing 
maritime security because of its deficiencies and gaps. Rather, the Navy is one of, if not, 
the most valuable tool to help provide maritime security to the maritime domain. It is the 
design of the current U.S. maritime security institution that is in large part responsible for 
the gaps in maritime security. 
2. The Problem is a Little Deeper Than Just Authority and Capability 
Although statue authorities negatively affect the U.S. Navy’s role in maritime law 
enforcement, they are by no means strictly binding, as clearly demonstrated earlier and 
cannot be blamed for the sole reason the Navy does not conduct law enforcement. 
International laws, lack of constitutional and congressional law, policy exception clauses, 
executive authority, and self-defense can give the U.S. Navy the means to act with law 
enforcement authority for almost the entire range of maritime threats. The blame must 
also be placed on the Navy’s long-standing focus on traditional warfighting. The U.S. 
                                                 
361 Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities: Hearing before the House Armed Services 
Committee, 112th Cong. 89 (November 3, 2011), 35–36. 
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Navy’s common mentality of “we do not do law enforcement,” is prevalent. Its force 
structure and focus on traditional warfare creates a mismatch for the needs of the 
maritime security missions it conducts on a daily basis. 
The Navy’s strategic culture provides a unique insight to how the Navy manages 
its maritime security mission. Much of its strategic culture is based on historical experience 
and cultural norms. Lack of nontraditional threats until their reemergence in the late twentieth 
century, the Posse Comitatus Act, and the existence of a separate and capable maritime law 
enforcement agency (the Coast Guard) led the U.S. Navy to dismiss constabulary maritime 
duties, which has been a traditional naval duty for hundreds of years.362 The Navy took 
advantage of a strategic opportunity (with the help of the Navy’s largest advocate Alfred 
T. Mahan) 363 to become the traditional, powerful, and technologically inclined force that 
exists today.  
The Navy’s unwillingness to break from tradition comes from the internal 
organizational resistance to change linked to habits, thinking, and routines. Tradition and 
independence is one of the most sacred cultural tenets of the Navy, as with many of the  
other armed services. Adherence to tradition, by definition, creates a culture of reluctance 
                                                 
362 Other global navies including the Spanish, Dutch, and British Royal Navies played an important 
role in preserving the freedom of the sea through constabulary means. Daniel Whiteneck, et al., The Navy 
at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2010), 10.  
363 Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 175. 
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to change. The U.S. Navy, being an organization steeped in tradition, has a long history 
of resistance to change.364  
The emergent threats on the entire maritime domain, bolstered by new 
technologies, and limited resources require new thinking and reevaluation of strategies to 
balance traditional and nontraditional threats. This is not easy for an organization that 
relies on its traditional strength and established principles. The resurgence of asymmetric 
threats and lack of peer competitors has put the Navy in a strategic dilemma. This is 
important because the adherence to tradition becomes a default position during times of 
strategic uncertainty. Although steps have been taken that increase the importance of 
confronting maritime security threats, the Navy’s independence and resistance to change 
put into question the effectiveness of these steps to institutionally adjust to the 
importance of maritime law enforcement. This kind of resistance can be related to the 
changes the FBI and CIA experienced after the fall of the Soviet Union leading up to the 
9/11 attacks.365 It will not changed until it is forced, or a tragic event occurs in which the 
U.S. Navy had the potential to stop, but could not. 
The purpose of this section is not to get deep into the Navy’s normative problems 
involved in accepting law enforcement roles for maritime security. It is to highlight 
                                                 
364 Documented resistance came in many forms. The first big challenge to change was amidst the 
great technological progresses of the 19th Century. Within the Navy there was fierce debate to embrace the 
change from sail power to steam power. The U.S. Navy slowly adopted steam power after being forced by 
Congress in 1834, and even then, proponents of traditional sail power still held out to have them 
incorporated amongst the first battleships during the 1890s, nearly six decades later Next, there was debate 
over metal ships versus the long established wooden ships. Then the debate shifted to battleships fleets 
versus carrier aviation fleets prior to World War II. The Navy has a history of resisting organizational 
change, not only from within, but from outside. Although bureaucracies are well documented to resist 
change, the Navy has shown to be keenly adept to this kind of resistance, stemming from organizational 
independence, a primary characteristic of the Navy. This was clearly shown during the debates that 
revolved around the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In both 
instances the Navy fiercely fought for to maintain its independence. Kenneth J Hagan and Michael T. 
McMaster, eds, In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History (Westport, Conn: Praeger 
Security International, 2008), 55-56, 71, 137, 143-145, 182, 190-191; Roger W Barnett, Navy Strategic 
Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 13; Douglas T. 
Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 77. 
364 James R. Locher III, Victory On The Potomac The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies The Pentagon 
(Texas A & M Univ Pr, 2004), 264. 
365 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 55.  
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briefly that the legal authority and capability issues were not the only aspect affecting the 
Navy’s operations. If tradition is important to the Navy, then it needs to look no further 
than at the previous navies that ruled the seas. They set an important precedent for the 
expected roles of the world’s ruling Navy. Every major global Navy in its day fought 
wars and embraced constabulary roles to keep the oceans free, safe, and secure. A quote 
from a nineteenth-century British Admiral summarizes these roles: 
I don’t think that we ever thought very much about War with a big W. We 
looked on the Navy more a world Police force than a warlike institution. 
We considered that our job was to safeguard law and order throughout the 
world – safeguard civilization, put fires out on shore, and act as guide 
philosopher and friend to the merchant ships of all nations.366  
For the British Royal Navy, as the nearly undisputed masters of the sea for nearly two 
hundred years, it is hard to argue that it lost its fighting edge serving a dual-purpose role. 
In many ways, the 21st century so far mirrors the threats and challenges of the 19th 
century. 367 It is important for both traditional enemies and criminals to fear a Navy 
warship. 
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS TO BE A CRITICAL NAVY 
CAPABILITY 
Are law enforcement roles a critical capability for the Navy? The answer is, yes, 
they should be. This is because in the maritime domain, there is no easy distinction 
between homeland and international, and we need to change the way we think about 
naval and maritime power. Adding law enforcement powers is an adaptive concept to 
meet the urgent needs of the 21st century maritime domain. Maritime law enforcement 
adds an innovative capability to transform our fleet into more capable and agile force to 
meet the vast array of threats on the maritime domain. As shown in Chapter V, without 
further research, this transformation can be done without tremendous cost to the 
operations and readiness of the force. Further data collection from the Navy in its MSO 
                                                 
366 Admiral Humphry Smith cited in Till, Seapower, 359.  
367 Till, Seapower, 359; Murphy, “Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Suitable Role for 
a Navy?,” 24. 
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and specialized research is needed to uncover hard statistics and derive specific costs 
related to the Navy in MSO to determine its true effect on operations, fiscal costs, and 
operational readiness. 
Maritime law enforcement is a critical capability that the Navy needs, but it is 
difficult to determine if it is worth it. The principal reason is that the Navy has not 
determined what capacity it has for maritime security missions. In other words, there is 
no threshold to determine if the costs are too high. “The Navy should determine its 
capacity for CIC,” 368  arose as one of the of RAND’s central issues in its The Navy Role 
in Confronting Irregular Challenges study. Because it is difficult to determine the right 
blend of maritime security and traditional warfare without strategic guidance, the worth it 
question is hard to answer. Answering this question is crucial in determining the Navy’s 
willingness to embrace the law enforcement needs for maritime security.  
C. RECOMMENDATION 
There are multiple means available to expand the Navy’s law enforcement 
capability and authority to platforms that may be involved with maritime security in the 
execution of its duty. It is important to address the options because each option can 
generate its own unique costs and benefits to the Navy’s budget, operations, and 
readiness. For example, some option costs are heavily associated with personnel costs, 
while others have heavier costs associated with training requirements. Four basic options 
that are representative of the many choices available are: Coast Guard expansion, Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service expansion, Navy organic LE expansion, and hybrid 
expansion. These options are meant to encourage the reader to contemplate the different 
options available while analyzing the associated fiscal cost, operations, and readiness 
concerns. Determining what is the right combination of options is an extensive subject 
area and worthy of further research to determine which combination provides the most 
benefit with the least amount of cost to the Navy.  
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1. Expand the Coast Guard Shiprider Programs 
The author recommends the expansion of Coast Guard support (LEDETs/Navy 
and Coast Guard crew integration). Expanding Coast Guard personnel support to the 
Navy provides a highly plausible option in order to expand the Navy’s law enforcement 
roles. If the Coast Guard is the best service to be conducting MSO, then they should be 
leading the charge abroad, in addition to the homeland. The growing demand for Coast 
Guard assets offers the most telling sign of the critical law enforcement capabilities that 
are needed. Particular benefits of expanding Coast Guard assets potentially are: 
• carry law enforcement authorities, including the regulatory and customs 
enforcement authorities, no need to change existing laws 
• provide tactical boarding capacity (may reduce VBSS staffing 
requirements), capability, and expertise  
• allow Navy personnel to focus on traditional warfighting skills 
• Coast Guard ship-rider process already established and well practiced 
through current use of LEDETs 
• potentially draws Coast Guard and Navy operations closer through 
increased necessity for coordination and cooperation 
• dual military/LE status preserves civil/military divide 
• relationships and access with other domestic and foreign LEAs and Coast 
Guards 
Some costs include:  
• requires funding from DHS, DoD, Navy, or Congress to resource Coast 
Guard expansion 
• requires increase in end-strength of Coast Guard personnel 
• less investigatory and exploitive intelligence skills, as compared to NCIS 
In this option, the Coast Guard provides the Navy authorities and capability at 
little or no costs to Navy personnel warfighting readiness and change in overall roles, 
therefore, appealing to the Navy’s cultural sensitivities to law enforcement roles. It 
benefits operations because it provides the law enforcement expertise the Navy requires, 
and it draws the Coast Guard and Navy operations closer. The largest negative effect is 
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the fiscal costs will increase from the need for more Coast Guardsmen, depending on the 
number of personnel required to provide sufficient LE coverage for the Navy platforms. 
The costs may be offset somewhat by reducing the costs associated with reducing Navy’s 
current VBSS training and equipments requirements. For example, a recent article in U.S. 
Naval Institutes Proceedings shows how the creation of specialized boarding teams can 
help reduce the cost burden to the Navy than the current setup. 369  This list is not 
exhaustive, but it merely highlights some basic costs and benefits for the Navy. In the 
end, the choice needs to a strategic one. If the military wants to constrict and focus on its 
primary goals, it needs to expand the capacity and reach of the Coast Guard and other 
maritime LEAs to provide the proper leverage that is needed.  
2. At a Minimum, Remove the Navy’s Law Enforcement Restrictions 
Abroad  
The laws for the nation also need to be changed. While the homeland authorities 
may be a harder sell, there is no legitimate reason to continue the Navy’s law 
enforcement restrictions abroad. Law Enforcement in the maritime domain is unique and 
fundamentally different than on land, and that precludes any justifiable reason to prevent 
the U.S. Navy from conducting maritime law enforcement. The vast oceans, its 
connectedness, limited jurisdictions, and its permeation to the all majority population 
centers are much more difficult to police than the territorial boundaries of land. The only 
powers able to govern the oceans are the naval units of countries and empires. The 
ocean’s uniqueness has created the need for laws that differ from standard civil law 
enforcement rules, even for the civilly conscious United States. For example, under Title 
14 USC, the U.S. Coast Guard does not require cause or warrants to perform search and 
seizure of vessels at sea, which has been reaffirmed by U.S. courts.370 Naval forces, in 
general, do not pose the same threat to civil rights and potential military rule as armies 
do. If a naval military service poses a serious threat to American civil liberties, then what 
about the U.S. Coast Guard? It is a military service that is armed, trained, and ready for 
                                                 
369 Kurt Albaugh and Jeremy Carriker, “Up Ladder,” Proceedings 138, no.1 (January 2012), 61–62. 
370 Abel, “Not Fit for Sea Duty,” 474–475. 
133 
 
combat duty, as has been the case for over 200 years. In fact, when U.S. Coast Guard 
forces are under the command of the U.S. Navy, they still maintain their Title 14 status to 
conduct law enforcement. The propriety of using the U.S. Coast Guard to enforce laws 
has never been questioned. Yet, the U.S. Navy technically cannot, even on the high seas. 
As Christopher Abel states, “This dichotomy seems curious, particularly given that no 
meaningful difference exists between the two services in this regard.”371 The real threat 
to civil liberties becomes truly difficult to apprehend. The false perception regarding 
Navy involvement civil affairs violations must be voiced, in order to remove the PCA 
screen the Navy uses to avoid LE missions. 
While the Navy can continue to leave the Coast Guard as the primary agency for 
maritime security operations and law enforcement, it does not relieve the Navy of the 
responsibility to gain a better understanding of the nature of the threat and determine 
ways that it can help maritime security. The greatest potential to solve the problem of 
Navy LE is the need for a shift in thinking to be further in line with the strategic priorities 
as laid out in U.S. naval doctrine. First, it needs to take place within the U.S. Navy. This 
can only happen, if the U.S. Navy is forced to directly participate in maritime law 
enforcement. Only after the U.S. Navy is forced to conduct of LE efforts needed in 
maritime security, can the discussion move forward to reduce the other restricting 
barriers. The only true legal barrier to U.S. Navy law enforcement lies with easily 
changeable DoD policies, which makes it a very thin barrier. But, it is heavily bolstered 
by those holding on to traditional thinking. Therefore, as long as the U.S. Navy continues 
to advocate the limitations it imposes on itself, DoD policy cannot change.  
If the U.S. Navy no longer operationally supports the restrictions placed by 
DODD 5525.5(c) and SECNAVINST 5820.7C, pressure can be placed on the SECDEF 
and SECNAV to utilize the exceptions to policy for mission sets and operations that 
require LE measures. The change in thinking will also permeate into training and 
operational doctrine. This can include the participation or adoption of LE training 
programs, like those offered by the U.S. Coast Guard, instead of ad hoc and inconsistent 
                                                 
371 Abel, “Not Fit for Sea Duty,” 478. 
134 
 
training that crews receive now. An asset properly trained to handle nontraditional threats 
will be more effective in situations that can potentially arise than one who is not. 
The potential exists to seize the opportunity to get the laws and policies changed 
to reduce the law enforcement restrictions on the Navy. Similar to the congressional 
mandates that forced the Navy to take greater responsibility in supporting law 
enforcement agencies in the 1980s, a recent call by a Congressional leader is asking what 
authorities the Navy needs to better meet its missions.372 
Together, the Navy and the Coast Guard makeup the finest naval institution in the 
world. Properly authorized and organized, they become the most compelling force to help 
overcome not only traditional threats, but the increasingly frequent and dangerous 
maritime security threats. If the Navy acquires law enforcement roles, then the maritime 
global commons seas will be more secure. 
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